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Dank Prof. Dr. Joachim Winter für konstruktive Anmerkungen während seiner
Tätigkeit als Zweitgutachter.
Die ersten beiden Kapitel der vorliegenden Arbeit wären nicht möglich gewesen,
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Preface
When making decisions today, people generally care about the future. This in-
evitably introduces expectations into most economic models where they exert an
influence on the dynamics of the economy. However, it may also be reasonable to
assume that the course of the economy influences expectations. But how do projec-
tions of future variables emerge over time? In many economic applications, it has
become standard to assume rationality of private agents. The implication is that
agents form expectations as the mathematical conditional expectation under com-
plete information about all relevant variables. As a result, agents are characterized
by perfect foresight within the framework of a certain model. Empirical research,
however, casts serious doubts on this assumption. There may be extended periods of
over- or underprediction on the part of private agents (biasedness) and, as a result,
forecast errors are mostly found to be informative (inefficiency). Similarly, Estrella
and Fuhrer (2002) argue that, from a theoretical point of view, models assuming
rational expectations induce counterfactual dynamics. In commonly employed mod-
els, expectations would jump instantaneously after agents have observed a shock to
the system and, consequently, expectations are not persistent. As a result, in purely
forward–looking models, disinflation is not accompanied by output loss. This also
is at odds with empirical findings (see Ball, 1995).
The three chapters of the present dissertation intend to shed some light on
specific issues concerning the formation of inflation expectations. In their seminal
papers, Taylor (1980), and Calvo (1983) have introduced the forward looking com-
ponent of inflation dynamics. This has lead to the derivation of the forward–looking
New Keynesian Phillips curve, which has then been extended to a hybrid version by
Gaĺı and Gertler (1999) also capturing a backward–looking component. Generally,
expectations about the future inflation rate determine the dynamics of the inflation
rate today. Most important, they influence the transmission of monetary policy
actions. Hence, monetary policy aims at influencing expectations and central banks
have put much emphasis on transparency, accountability and credibility. The reduc-
tion and stabilization of long–term inflation expectations – i.e. the unconditional
mean of the inflation rate – is crucial for the implementation and maintenance of
ix
a low inflation regime. This is one reason why monetary policy strategies such as
inflation forecast targeting have been developed, which aim at directly steering in-
flation expectations in order to prevent output loss (see Svensson, 1997). Therefore,
it will be of importance to measure inflation expectations correctly and to analyze
the expectation formation process thoroughly.
Chapter 1 presents an enhancement of the traditional techniques applied to
obtain quantitative measures of inflation expectations from qualitative surveys1.
The original method proposed by Carlson and Parkin (1975) assumes that individ-
ual survey responses on expected inflation are based on the respondents’ underlying
subjective probability density function. Hence, they report inflation to go up (down)
if the median of this distribution lies above (below) some indifference interval. The
upper and lower boundary marks the so–called just noticeable difference. Carlson
and Parkin (1975) assumed symmetric and time–invariant boundaries. Addition-
ally, they had to impose unbiasedness of expectations to obtain an estimate of the
indifference interval which, of course, prevents us from testing the nature of expec-
tation formation. Here, we can avoid this problem by using additional information
from respondents of the CESifo World Economic Survey. Moreover, we can relax
the assumption of a symmetric indifference interval, as it turns out that respondents
seem to react more sensitively to an expected fall in the inflation rate than to a rise.
Furthermore, we can reject the assumption of constant boundaries and establish
a relationship from psychophysics (Weber–Fechner Law) instead: The boundaries
turn out to be an increasing function of the perceived current rate of inflation. When
testing the derived quantitative measures of inflation expectations, it becomes ap-
parent that the unbiasedness assumption does not hold for all countries considered
here. Thus, traditional conversion techniques can be misleading.
Chapter 2 sheds some light on the dynamics of inflation rates, explicitly allow-
ing for non–rational expectation formation in the estimation of the New Keynesian
Phillips curve (NKPC)2. In general, it will matter for the dynamics of the inflation
rate whether expectations are rational or not. As argued above, it seems reason-
able to reject rationality of expectations. Here, using the concept of subjective
expectations of firms, we assume that inflation expectations, that enter the NKPC,
themselves are sluggish and, hence, may introduce additional persistence to infla-
tion rates. In empirical studies, forward–looking relationships are mostly estimated
by GMM, which relies on the fact that forecast errors are orthogonal to the infor-
mation set which is available to the forecaster (McCallum, 1976). In other words,
GMM is only appropriate if expectations are rational in the sense of Muth (1961)
1The chapter relies on Henzel and Wollmershäuser (2005), which is published in Journal of
Business Cycle Measurement and Analysis.
2The chapter relies on Henzel and Wollmershäuser (2008), which is forthcoming in Economic
Modelling.
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(see, Pesaran, 1987 and Mavroeidis, 2005). However, as mentioned before, infla-
tion expectations are often found to be biased and inefficient predictors of future
inflation. Hence, we estimate the NKPC by using direct measures of expectations
obtained from the CESifo World economic survey. Assuming subjective instead of
rational expectations, it can be shown that there is a prominent role for backward–
looking behavior in the price setting of firms. Moreover, the use of survey data gives
estimates that are stable over time and endogeneity of expectations can be rejected.
Chapter 3 analyzes whether the expectation formation process can be modeled
by a learning rule, according to which unobserved trend inflation is estimated by
signal extraction3. Having stated the non–rationality of inflation expectations in
surveys, it becomes apparent that also the implied jump behavior of expectations
following an unanticipated policy shock is at odds with the empirical observation.
Hence, coming from a theoretical point of view, it makes sense to model sluggish
adjustment of inflation expectations after a monetary policy shock. One reasonable
assumption in this context is that trend inflation is not directly observable by private
agents. A possible solution to the problem is the estimation of unobserved trend
components by Kalman filter recursions. In the analysis, the latter constitute the
learning rule on the part of private agents. Assuming adaptive learning behavior
in the event of unobserved policy shocks will now induce real short–term effects of
monetary policy, very much like repeated unanticipated policy shocks under ratio-
nal expectations. This, in turn, provides a rationale why disinflation may cause
significant output loss. However, this assumption has to be tested empirically and
therefore, a signal extraction model is fit to survey measures of U.S. inflation expec-
tations. These in–sample results suggest rather slow learning of trends, which would
explain the sluggishness of U.S. inflation expectations during the FED’s disinflation
policy under the presidency of Volcker. Furthermore, in a forecasting simulation
exercise, it turns out that learning by Kalman filtering approximates U.S. survey
expectations closest. However, signal extraction behavior cannot explain the pro-
cess of expectation formation perfectly. On the whole, the analysis shows, that a
weighted average of different types of expectation formation with a prominent role
for signal extraction behavior is well suited to explain survey measures of inflation
expectations during the Volcker disinflation.
3The chapter relies on Henzel (2008), which is available as ifo Working Paper 55.
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Chapter 1
Quantifying Inflation Expectations
with the Carlson-Parkin Method –
A Survey-based Determination of
the Just Noticeable Difference
Abstract
This paper presents a new methodology for the determination of the just
noticeable difference which is required for the quantification of qualita-
tive survey data. Traditional conversion methods, such as the probability
approach of Carlson and Parkin (1975), the regression method of Pesaran
(1984) or the time-varying parameters model of Seitz (1988), require very
restrictive assumptions concerning the properties of the just noticeable
difference and the expectations formation process of survey respondents.
Our methodology avoids these assumptions. The novelty lies in the way
the boundaries, inside of which survey respondents expect the variable
under consideration to remain unchanged, are determined. Instead of de-
riving this so-called just noticeable difference from the qualitative survey
responses and from the statistical properties of the reference time-series,
we directly queried them from survey respondents by a special question
in the CESifo World Economic Survey. The new methodology is then
applied to expectations about the future development of inflation which
are included in the CESifo World Economic Survey.
1
2 CHAPTER1: QUANTIFYING INFLATION EXPECTATIONS
1.1 Introduction
Expectations play a crucial role in macroeconomics. In consumption theory the
life-cycle and permanent income approaches stress the role of expected future in-
come. In New Keynesian Macroeconomics firms set prices as a mark-up over a
weighted average of current and expected future nominal marginal costs. Central
banks closely monitor the private sector’s inflation expectations. Exchange rates
and share prices depend on the expected future development of their fundamental
determinants. Many other examples could be given.
In empirical work expectations on future macroeconomic variables can be
treated in two ways. One is to set-up a theory on how private agents form their
expectations. The current standard methodology for modeling expectations is to as-
sume rationality of economic agents which goes back to the seminal paper of Muth
(1961). Assuming rational expectations has the effect that empirical models can
only be tested by putting up a joint hypothesis on the model and on the expecta-
tions’ formation process simultaneously. The second way to introduce expectations
into empirical models is through direct measures of expectations derived from sur-
veys of households, firms and other economic agents (see Theil (1952) for an early
paper). The advantage of survey data is that expectations are given exogenously in
the context of a model, and that the nature of the expectations’ formation process
can be investigated separately.
This paper focuses on inflation expectations obtained from the CESifo World
Economic Survey (WES). So far, these variables have only been presented in the
form of a qualitative balance statistic, indicating whether the majority of the polled
economic experts expects the inflation rate to rise, to remain constant, or to decline
by the end of the next six months. Qualitative surveys therefore only provide a
direction of change for a given variable, rather than an exact figure. Even though
this survey technique is quite common (see for example the Consumer Survey con-
ducted by the European Commission)1, balance statistics are often of limited use
1The reasons why survey participants are not directly asked to quantify their expectations
can be divided into two categories. The first reason is of practical nature and has to do with
incentives. Since the participation at the survey is voluntary, the completion of the questionnaire
must be as simple as possible in order to not discourage respondents from participating. Typically,
they are asked to forecast a broad set of macroeconomic variables (such as GDP growth, inflation,
unemployment, interest rates, exchange rates, share prices, etc.) so that it would be relatively
time-consuming to provide a precise quantitative estimate for all these variables. The second
reason is of statistical nature. It is often claimed that qualitative surveys are less susceptible to
measurement errors: “(...) to the extent that expectations are ‘attitudes or states of mind’ of the
respondents and are not merely forecasts, methods based on the measurement of ordinal responses
seem less likely to be subject to measurement errors than direct attempts at cardinal measurement
of expectations” (Pesaran, 1984, p. 34).
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for econometric analyses. For this reason, expectations which are collected as qual-
itative survey data are often converted into quantitative estimates of the variables
under consideration.
The most widely used conversion method goes back to a paper by Carlson and
Parkin (1975). Their method assumes that individual responses about the future
value of a variable are based on the respondents’ subjective probability density
function. Respondents report a variable to go up or down if the median of their
subjective probability distribution lies above or below an indifference interval. The
upper and lower boundary of the indifference interval which mark the so-called
just noticeable difference are derived from the respondents’ aggregate answers and
the time-series properties of past realizations of the macroeconomic variable under
consideration. Most crucially, Carlson and Parkin (1975) assumed the aggregate
distribution to be normal with symmetric and time-invariant boundaries that are
allowed to vary across countries. Additionally, they imposed that the average value
of past realizations and the average value of expectations must be equal, which is
typically referred to as the unbiasedness of expectations.
As these assumptions are rather restrictive a number of authors suggested ex-
tensions and alternatives to the Carlson-Parkin method (see Nardo (2003) and the
papers cited there). An important alternative was the regression approach which
was introduced by Pesaran (1984). The basic idea is to use the relationship between
realizations (measured by official statistics) and respondents’ perceptions of the past
(which is additionally queried in many surveys) and to estimate the just noticeable
difference on the basis of this observable data. In order to quantify the respondents’
expectations about the future development of the variable under consideration, Pe-
saran (1984) then used these estimates and imposed them on the qualitative ex-
pectations data. Thus, in contrast to Carlson and Parkin’s probability approach,
quantitative expectations calculated by the regression method are a function of a
specific regression model, rather than a function of a specific probability distribution.
While the regression approach accounted for the possibility of an asymmetric just
noticeable difference, Seitz (1988) developed an important extension that explicitly
allows for asymmetric and time-varying boundaries. Though theoretically appeal-
ing, this so-called time-varying parameters method was criticized mainly because of
the way the boundaries were modeled using the Kalman filter technique. Moreover,
as stressed by Batchelor and Orr (1988), both alternatives to the Carlson-Parkin
method assume unbiased expectations, because the just noticeable difference is in-
ferred from a regression of actual inflation on the respondents’ perceived inflation.
The novelty of the present paper is that we convert qualitative survey re-
sponses into quantitative measures for inflation expectations without having to rely
on assumptions concerning the evolution of the boundaries and the expectations
formation process. In contrast to the three traditional methods (Carlson-Parkin,
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regression, time-varying parameters) we do not implicitly derive the just noticeable
difference from the qualitative survey responses and from the statistical properties
of the reference time-series, but from a special question in the July 2004 CESifo
WES in which we directly query the respondents’ boundaries of the indifference
interval for a given current inflation rate. This allows us to explicitly test whether
the boundaries are indeed symmetric and time-invariant, whether the just notice-
able difference varies across countries as suggested by the traditional methods, and
whether the inflation expectations that are computed on the basis of the queried
just noticeable difference are indeed unbiased.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 1.2 we shortly
present the CESifo WES. Section 1.3 gives a short summary of the traditional con-
version methods, and applies them to selected countries included in the CESifo
WES. Our proposal of a survey based determination of the just noticeable differ-
ence is presented in section 1.4. The paper concludes with a summary of the main
findings.
1.2 The CESifo World Economic Survey
The CESifo WES assesses trends in the world economy by polling transnational
as well as national organizations worldwide about economic developments in the
respective country. It is conducted in co–operation of Ifo Institute for Economic
Research in Munich and the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris.
The questionnaire of the CESifo WES is distributed four times a year (January,
April, July and October). The participants are asked to give their assessment of the
general economic situation and expectations regarding important macroeconomic
indicators of the country they inhabit. Currently, the CESifo WES asks about 1100
experts in 90 countries. The survey was first conducted in 1983. A question on the
expected inflation rate, which is in the focus of the present paper, was only included
since July 1991. Survey participants are asked to give their expectations on the
inflation rate by the end of the next six months. They indicate UP for an expected
rise in the inflation rate, SAME for no change in the inflation rate and DOWN for
an expected fall in the inflation rate.
The questionnaire therefore reveals qualitative information on the participants’
expectations of the future inflation rate. The individual replies are combined for each
country without weighting. The ‘grading’ procedure consists in giving a grade of 9
to positive replies (UP), a grade of 5 to indifferent replies (SAME ) and a grade of 1
to negative replies (DOWN ). The country average which may range from 1 to 9 is
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published as a balance statistic.2 Average grades within the range of 5 to 9 indicate
that a majority expects inflation to rise, whereas grades within the range of 1 to 5
reveal predominantly expectations of decreasing inflation rates. What is lacking is
a precise quantitative estimate of the inflation rate that is expected on average.
1.3 Traditional Conversion Techniques
This section only gives a very short summary of the conversion techniques that are
typically used in the literature. The survey articles by Nardo (2003) and Pesaran
and Weale (2006) provide a more detailed overview of the issues surrounding the
quantification of qualitative survey responses.
1.3.1 The Probability Approach of Carlson and Parkin
Conception
The probability approach was first employed by Theil (1952) and was rediscovered
by Carlson and Parkin (1975) who used the method to construct quantitative mea-
sures for inflation expectations. It basically requires two types of ingredients: the
basis of the variable under consideration and the qualitative answers of each respon-
dent. The basis is simply the last value that is observable for the individual being
asked. As the CESifo WES asks for the expected change in the inflation rate, the
basis is the inflation rate πt which is published for the current quarter.
3
The qualitative answer of respondent i is a result of an individual probability
distribution over the possible future values of the variable in question. The respon-
dents are supposed to report the mean of the distribution. The individual answer
is DOi,t, if the mean of the expected value of the change in inflation by the end of
time t + k, Et∆πi,t+k, is smaller than some value ai,t (Et∆πi,t+k < ai,t). Et∆πi,t+k
is defined as Etπi,t+k − πt and is measured in percentage points. Likewise, the indi-
vidual answer is UPi,t, if Et∆πi,t+k is larger than some value bi,t (Et∆πi,t+k > bi,t).
Finally, the individual answer is SAMEi,t, if Et∆πi,t+k is within the lower and upper
boundary of the indifference interval ai,t and bi,t (ai,t ≤ Et∆πi,t+k ≤ bi,t). Assume
that the distributions are independent across respondents and that they have a com-
mon form with finite mean and variance. Further assume that the upper and lower
boundaries are identical for all respondents in the population (ai,t = at, bi,t = bt).
2Balance Statistic = [(9×
∑
UP )+(5×∑ SAME)+(1×∑ DOWN)]
(
∑
UP+
∑
SAME+
∑
DOWN)
3In section 1.4 we will show that a publication or an information lag can be ruled out in our
case.
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Then the survey results as a whole can be interpreted as a sampling from some
aggregate distribution.
From this follows that the percentage of the responses expecting a rise and
a fall which we denote by UPt and DOt, respectively, converge to the associated
population values:
1− UPt = Φ
(
bt − Et∆πt+k
σt+k
)
DOt = Φ
(
at − Et∆πt+k
σt+k
)
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of an assumed standard normal
variate, and Et∆πt+k and σt+k are the mean and the standard deviation of the
aggregate distribution of inflation expectations. The quantiles can be calculated as:
rt = Φ
−1 (1− UPt) = bt − Et∆πt+k
σt+k
,(1.1)
ft = Φ
−1 (DOt) =
at − Et∆πt+k
σt+k
.(1.2)
After eliminating σt+k and by solving for Et∆πt+k one finally obtains the following
expression for inflation expectations:
(1.3) Et∆πt+k =
bt ft − at rt
ft − rt .
A crucial step of the quantification procedure is the determination of the just
noticeable difference, i.e. the upper and lower boundary of the indifference inter-
val. Carlson and Parkin (1975) assumed symmetric and time-invariant boundaries:
c = −at = bt for the just noticeable difference in average price. If we follow that pro-
cedure for the perceived change in inflation and assume on average that expectations
are correct:
(1.4)
1
T
T∑
t=1
Et∆πt+k =
1
T
T∑
t=1
(πt − πt−k).
Using equation (1.3) for calculating the expected change in the inflation rate and
setting at = −c and bt = c, equation (1.4) becomes:
T∑
t=1
c (ft + rt)
ft − rt =
T∑
t=1
(πt − πt−k),
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which gives the following estimate for c :
(1.5) ĉ =
(
T∑
t=1
(πt − πt−k)
)
/
(
T∑
t=1
ft + rt
ft − rt
)
.
Application to the CESifo WES
The results of the quantification of qualitative inflation expectations from the CESifo
WES using the Carlson-Parkin method are shown in figures 1.1 and 1.2. Even
though the CESifo WES covers 90 countries, for the analyses in this paper, we
only consider countries where the average number of respondents is reasonably large
in order to comply with the assumption of normally distributed answers: France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US.4 Inflation expectations for the Euro
Zone were computed using a weighted sum of responses for the individual member
countries (which are all included in the CESifo WES ) according to
DOEURt =
J∑
j=1
ωjt DO
j
t and UP
EUR
t =
J∑
j=1
ωjt UP
j
t
where the index j refers to each of the J Euro zone member countries, ωjt are the
country weights used by Eurostat to calculate the Harmonized Index of Consumer
Prices (HICP) for the Euro Zone, and DOjt and UP
j
t are the fractions of respondents
who indicated DOWN and UP in country j.5 The sample period runs from 1991:2
to 2004:2 at a quarterly frequency. The charts show the expected inflation rate at t
for t + 2 (Etπt+2) together with the prevailing inflation rate at time t (πt), which is
taken from the OECD database. The balance statistic is depicted as a bar chart in
the lower panel. The estimates of the just noticeable difference are shown in table
1.1.
For Germany, the estimated just noticeable difference is ĉ = 0.27. This means
that an expected increase (fall) in the inflation rate of 0.27 percentage points is
necessary to make the respondent indicate UP (DOWN ) in the questionnaire. For
the Euro Zone and Japan the estimates are somewhat higher.
In the case of France, the UK and the US ĉ becomes negative, which implies
that in figures 1.1 and 1.2 the converted values for inflation expectations turn out
4Countries in which the average number of answers is small are mainly smaller economies. This
is due to the fact that the CESifo WES only asks domestic experts and the number of respondents
is positively correlated with the size of the economy.
5Before 2002:1 there were no respondents from Luxembourg so that the weights had to be
adjusted accordingly.
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ĉ ĉ
France: 2.04 Euro Zone: 0.51
France: ♦ -0.49 Japan: 0.72
Germany: 0.27 UK: -0.46
Italy: -8.43 UK: ♦ -0.91
Italy: ♦ 0.65 US: -0.23
Note: For the countries in which outliers occurred
due to the conversion of inflation expectations from
qualitative into quantitative data we calculated the
indifference band with and without the outlier. A
♦ marks the cases where the outlier was included.
Table 1.1: Estimates of c using the Carlson-Parkin method
to be in opposition to the direction of change indicated by the balance statistic. To
explain this result, it is important to see that in those countries expectations have
been, on average, far from being correct for many years. Take the US as an example.
Throughout the first part of the sample, the balance statistic shows an expected rise
in the inflation rate which is clearly in contrast to the disinflation episode at the
beginning of the nineties. A more detailed analysis of the balance statistic reveals
that for the US only 55% (57%) of expected rises (falls) have effectively been followed
by an increase (decrease) in inflation six months later. By contrast, expectations
in Germany have been more correct on average, as this share amounts to 73% for
both, expected rises and falls. Thus, for the US the time series is forced into the
‘correct’ direction, because the Carlson-Parkin method assumes the unbiasedness of
expectations. As ĉ is used to scale the time series of expectations, it acts as a degree
of freedom and turns the survey results upside down. For the UK and France, this
is not so obvious.
In these two countries, the calculations suffer from another problem, which is
the occurrence of outliers. This problem also appears for Italy, where we calculated
a value of ĉ = 0.65. An explanation for the occurrence of outliers can be given
by taking a look at the Italian microdata of the survey conducted in July 1996.
Table 1.2 shows that none of the 16 respondents indicated UP or SAME. As
the responses of the basic population are assumed to be normally distributed, no
response in the UP -SAME-DOWN categories may be the result of an insufficient
sample size. Even after having corrected the data as proposed in appendix 1.A, the
inflation expectation in the second quarter of 1996 still remains an outlier. And
it is important to understand that this outlier has a decisive impact on the just
noticeable difference when the Carlson-Parkin method is applied. A calculation of
the indifference interval where this observation is dropped yields a value of ĉ =
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Figure 1.1: Quantification with the Carlson-Parkin method
−8.43.6 A similar argumentation can be applied to France, where we observe an
outlier in the third quarter of 2000. The outcome of the survey of October 2000 in
France is shown in table 1.2. In contrast to the case before, here, the insufficient
sample size results in only one respondent in the category SAME, while the rest
is distributed over the remaining categories. Moreover, none of the corrections
proposed in appendix 1.A had to be applied here. If the observation is dropped for
the calculation of the indifference interval, a value for ĉ of 2.04 results. The outcome
of the survey in the UK in July 1991, where we also observe an outlier, is depicted in
table 1.2. The calculation of the just noticeable difference without the outlier gives
a value of −0.46. It becomes clear that the shift of the indifference interval can be
quite substantial when the outlier is omitted.
6In table 1.1 a ♦ marks the cases where the outlier was included.
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Figure 1.2: Quantification with the Carlson-Parkin method ctd.
Shortcomings of the Carlson-Parkin Method
There are several shortcomings related with the Carlson-Parkin method which have
all been discussed intensively by Nardo (2003). In our view, the most important
restriction is that it imposes a priori the assumption of unbiasedness, which is a
necessary condition for rational expectations. Obviously, this assumption is not
very useful when one wants to test the nature of the expectation formation process.
For instance, ‘bad expectations’ are forced to be correct on average by way of scaling
the time-series with the help of the indifference interval, which, in turn, can give
non-interpretable results.
While Carlson and Parkin (1975) and most other subsequent papers dealing
with quantification of inflation expectations resorted to scaling the quantitative
series by the average level of inflation, the specific design of the inflation question in
the CESifo WES makes it necessary to use changes in inflation instead. However,
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UPt SAMEt DOt
fractions before correction 0 0 1
Italy uncorrected number of responses 0 0 16
(July 1996) fractions after correction 0.015 0.015 0.967
corrected number of responses 0.24 0.24 15.52
fractions before correction 0.619 0.048 0.333
France uncorrected number of responses 13 1 7
(Oct. 2000) fractions after correction − − −
corrected number of responses − − −
fractions before correction 0 0.056 0.944
UK uncorrected number of responses 0 1 17
(July 1991) fractions after correction 0.027 0.056 0.917
corrected number of responses 0.49 1 16.51
Table 1.2: Violation of the normality assumption
this can create a problem if inflation has no trend, resulting in an average change
of zero and, hence, ĉ = 0, irrespective of survey results ft and rt. Note that in
the applications of the previous section, all average changes in the inflation rate
(πt − πt−2) were below zero, ranging from -0.05 in France to -0.25 in the UK.
A further shortcoming is that the indifference interval is endogenously deter-
mined and, hence, changes with the observed survey results. It also moves with the
corrections we had to make due to the violation of the normality assumption. Al-
together, the fact that we calculated so many different indifference intervals across
countries does not seem to be very plausible. In fact, there is no obvious reason
why the perception of changes in the inflation rate should differ so dramatically
across countries. Of course, given the very small average changes in inflation rates
over the various samples, it is not clear, whether the estimates of c are significantly
different in a statistical sense. A plausible stochastic process for generating the data
could give rise to a very high variance of these estimates. One possibility to circum-
vent this problem would be to try to develop a method that first converts expected
changes in inflation rates to levels of expected inflation before trying to scale for a
just noticeable difference. We propose another possibility in section 1.4 and obtain
critical values from the survey itself.
While these problems of the Carlson-Parkin method are rarely addressed in
the literature7, the two assumptions that c is constant in the sense that it neither
7The form of the distribution is the subject of research papers by Berk (2000) who studied
symmetric and asymmetric t-distributions or Batchelor and Orr (1988) and Fishe and Lahiri (1981)
who assume a logistic distribution. However, these authors did not propose any solution to small
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varies over time nor with the inflationary environment, and that it is symmetric –
meaning that respondents are equally sensitive to an expected rise and an expected
fall of the inflation rate – have been subject to various modifications.
The Weber-Fechner Law
In this section we propose an extension of the Carlson-Parkin method that relaxes
the assumption of constant and time-invariant boundaries of the indifference inter-
val. In signal detection theory – a discipline of psychophysics – it is a well known
concept that the just noticeable difference varies in proportion to the base stimulus
an individual is exposed to. In other words, the higher the level of the base stimulus,
the higher must be the change of this stimulus to be perceived by an individual. As
this was first discovered by Weber (1834) and Fechner (1889), this concept is called
the Weber-Fechner law. It was originally proven in experiments for physical stimuli
like sound and weight and it has already been addressed in studies by Batchelor
(1986), Batchelor and Orr (1988) and Fishe and Lahiri (1981).8
In this section we integrate the Weber-Fechner law into the Carlson-Parkin
method. Therefore, equation (1.5) has to be modified in order to allow for variable,
but still symmetric, boundaries of the indifference interval. According to the Weber-
Fechner law, the just noticeable difference c can be written as a linear function of
the base stimulus, which is in our case πt:
(1.6) c = γ πt.
Thus, c varies over time in proportion to the inflation rate that prevails at the time
expectations are formed. γ is the scaling factor which has to be computed in order
to convert qualitative expectations into quantitative measures. Inserting equation
(1.6) into equation (1.5) gives the following estimate for γ:
(1.7) γ̂ =
(
T∑
t=1
(πt − πt−k)
)
/
(
T∑
t=1
πt (ft + rt)
ft − rt
)
.
sample problems.
8Batchelor (1986) calculates symmetric indifference bands with the help of the Carlson-Parkin
method using qualitative survey data of eight European Community countries over the period
1974-1982. The theoretical model that he uses to describe the Weber-Fechner law is derived from
the optimizing behavior of agents that minimize a statistical error. He finds that the perception
of the inflation rate cannot be described by the Weber-Fechner law in its original version. Instead
he estimates a negative influence of the base stimulus on the magnitude of the just noticeable
difference. Nevertheless, he comes to the conclusion that the assumption of a constant indifference
interval is untenable.
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For the countries in our sample the calculated values for γ̂ are shown in table
1.3. Similar to the results obtained by the Carlson-Parkin method, for some coun-
tries in which γ̂ < 0 the upper and lower boundary of the indifference interval are
turned upside down. In addition to the problem of the correct sign which arises from
the imposition of unbiased expectations, the parameter γ̂ varies remarkably across
countries for which we do not find a plausible explanation. As before, the results
seem to be driven to a large extent by some single observations, because the results
change significantly when the outliers are dropped. Finally, the main shortcomings
of the Carlson-Parkin method are not resolved.
γ̂ γ̂
France: 0.43 Euro Zone: 0.15
France:♦ -0.65 Japan: 0.52
Germany: 0.05 UK: -0.23
Italy: -1.82 UK:♦ -3.44
Italy:♦ 0.15 US: -0.09
Note: For the countries in which outliers occurred
due to the conversion of inflation expectations
from qualitative into quantitative data we calcu-
lated the indifference band with and without the
outlier. A ♦ marks the cases where the outlier was
included.
Table 1.3: Estimates of γ
1.3.2 The Regression Approach
The OLS Method
As an alternative to the probability method for the derivation of quantitative ex-
pectations, Pesaran (1984) developed the regression approach. Rather than being
a function of a specific probability distribution, the just noticeable difference and,
hence, quantitative expectations are a function of a specific regression model. In
contrast to the probability method, the regression approach allows for an asym-
metric indifference interval. Using equation (1.3) and assuming that a and b are
constant over time, the boundaries can be estimated with OLS:
(1.8) Et∆πt+k = b
ft
ft − rt − a
rt
ft − rt + εt.
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The problem however is that equation (1.8) cannot be estimated directly, since
Et∆πt+k = Etπt+k−πt is unknown. In fact, it will be the outcome of the quantifica-
tion procedure. One possibility to solve this problem is proposed by Entorf (1990),
who replaces expectations with future realizations:9
(1.9) Et∆πt+k = ∆πt+k.
Using equation (1.9) together with equation (1.8) we can estimate the unknown pa-
rameters. The results including p-values in brackets are shown in table 1.4. Newey-
West adjusted standard errors were used to calculate the test statistic.
OLS TVP
â b̂ −â = b̂ 1
T
∑T
t=1 ât
1
T
∑T
t=1 b̂t
Euro Zone: −0.28
[0.01]
0.19
[0.22]
0.49 −0.41
(0.20)
0.37
(0.26)
France: −0.24
[0.13]
0.21
[0.34]
0.82 −0.34
(0.41)
0.30
(0.23)
France:♦ 0.01
[0.92]
−0.07
[0.45]
0.69 −0.29
(0.44)
0.25
(0.22)
Germany: −0.29
[0.02]
0.25
[0.09]
0.85 −0.27
(0.41)
0.21
(0.32)
Italy: −0.44
[0.00]
0.16
[0.15]
0.12 −0.35
(0.40)
0.00
(0.29)
Italy:♦ −0.26
[0.00]
0.01
[0.92]
0.21 −0.35
(0.40)
−0.01
(0.30)
Japan: −0.65
[0.00]
0.68
[0.00]
0.82 −0.63
(0.35)
0.54
(0.17)
UK: −0.70
[0.00]
0.24
[0.09]
0.15 −0.77
(0.40)
0.38
(0.51)
UK:♦ −0.55
[0.00]
0.19
[0.19]
0.22 −0.76
(0.40)
0.35
(0.51)
US: −0.67
[0.03]
0.13
[0.29]
0.08 −0.75
(0.40)
0.25
(0.32)
Note: For the countries in which outliers occurred due to the conversion of
inflation expectations from qualitative into quantitative data we estimated
the boundaries with and without the outlier. A ♦ marks the cases where the
outlier was included. P-values are presented in brackets, standard errors are
in parentheses. T is the number of observations.
Table 1.4: Estimates of a and b
The estimates of the upper and lower boundary have the correct signs whenever
we controlled for the outlier using a dummy variable. If the outlier is included the
9Pesaran (1984) originally used queried data on the perceived changes of the past which he
regressed on the realized inflation rate to estimate the boundaries. As the CESifo WES does not
query the perception of the past, this approach cannot be applied.
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estimated values change to some extend but the signs remain correct, except for
France where both estimates have the wrong sign. But also note that they are not
significant. On the whole, only for Japan significance levels are satisfactory.
Within this framework, we can actually test whether the indifference interval is
symmetric by conducting a heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent Wald-
test on H0 : −a = b. The corresponding p-values, which are shown in table 1.4,
imply that only in the US asymmetric behavior seems to play a role. In all other
cases we cannot reject H0, which is probably due to the fact that – except for
Germany, Japan and the UK – the estimated boundaries are insignificant. Although
the boundaries still vary across countries, the differences are somewhat smaller than
in the last sections. Concerning the unbiasedness issue it can easily be shown that the
expectation error is identical to the estimated error term ε̂t.
10 Hence, the converted
inflation expectations will be unbiased by assumption.
The Time-Varying Parameters Method
An important extension to the regression approach was introduced by Seitz (1988),
who proposed to estimate equation (1.3) with time-varying parameters. In contrast
to the regression approach in the last section, the boundaries of the indifference
interval at and bt are allowed to vary over time. In order to estimate the related
state-space model via Kalman filter, an assumption about the stochastic process
underlying the evolution of the boundaries over time has to be made. In his paper
Seitz (1988) modeled them as a random walk.11
Like in the last section we replace the expectation term on the LHS of equation
(1.3) by its realization. To calculate the just noticeable difference over time, we
used the permanent component, which we obtained from the smoothed parameter
estimates. Table 1.4 presents the mean of the estimates of the upper and lower
boundary. Both appear to have the correct sign on average in all countries, except for
Italy when we include the outlier. However, the standard deviation of the coefficients
which is shown in parentheses is quite large in all cases. We take this as a hint that
the indifference interval is far from being constant over time (see appendix 1.B for
a chart).
A major disadvantage of this approach is, again, that the threshold values de-
10Note that Et∆πt+k = b̂ ftft−rt − â
rt
ft−rt and ∆πt+k − ε̂t = b̂
ft
ft−rt − â
rt
ft−rt . Substituting for the
RHS yields ∆πt+k−Et∆πt+k = ε̂t or πt+k−Etπt+k = ε̂t. The original proposal by Pesaran (1984)
does not avoid the unbiasedness assumption either, as it extrapolates the relationship between the
respondents’ perception and the actual outcome to the expected evolution of the inflation rate (see
also Batchelor and Orr (1988) on this point).
11In accordance with Pesaran (1984), Seitz (1988) originally used queried data on the perceived
changes of the past.
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pend on the way expectations are connected to realizations. Another criticism con-
cerns the way the thresholds are modeled by the estimation technique. As pointed
out by Nardo (2003), there are no economic or psychological reasons to suppose that
individuals have an indifference interval that follows a random walk.
1.4 Survey-Based Determination of the Just No-
ticeable Difference
The traditional conversion methods calculate the just noticeable difference on the
basis of time-series properties of realized changes in inflation (see equations (1.4)
and (1.9)). To overcome the shortcomings that are related to these proceedings
and their underlying assumptions, we determine the boundaries of the indifference
interval by a survey. For this purpose we asked the participants of the CESifo WES
in July 2004 an additional question with a view to get more information about the
way the respondents actually form their expectations. It was put the following way:
The following question focuses on the expectations regarding the rate of
inflation (as asked in question 4 of the WES questionnaire).
a) The current rate of inflation is (change of consumer prices compared
to the same month previous year): %.
b) The expected rate of inflation must rise above % to make you
mark ‘higher’ in the WES questionnaire.
c) The expected rate of inflation must fall below % to make you
mark ‘lower’ in the WES questionnaire.
With the help of the answers to these questions, we are able to address several im-
portant issues that are related to the traditional conversion methods. First, does
the Weber-Fechner law provide a valid description of the perception of changes in
inflation? And if so, does this perception follow a symmetric and linear pattern?
Second, is there any evidence that the just noticeable difference varies across coun-
tries? Third, what is the information set of the respondents at the time they fill
in the survey and, hence, the basis on which they form their expectations? Finally,
does the assumption of unbiased expectations reflect the true process of expectation
formation?
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1.4.1 Data Description
Before presenting the results of our analysis, we provide a short description of the
responses that we received. The additional question was answered by 437 experts
from 78 countries all over the world. This has the advantage of obtaining a large
spectrum of perceived inflation rates. The highest inflation rate was reported with
a value of 580 per cent and the lowest had a value of -1.5 per cent. The mean of the
answers concerning the perceived inflation rate was 10.54 per cent with a standard
deviation of about 54.39 per cent. 95 per cent of the questionnaires were returned
to the Ifo Institute between July 05 and July 15, 2004. Unfortunately, some of the
answers were missing or incomplete so that they have been of no use for the analysis:
• 10 questionnaires were incomplete because respondents did not answer part
a).
• In addition, with 35 questionnaires there was no answer to both, part b) and
c).
• In the sample, there is one country which we excluded because of an excep-
tionally high inflation rate (Zimbabwe). This reduced the sample size by 7.
Our data set then included only observed inflation rates from -1.5 to 22 per
cent.
• In 16 of the remaining cases, respondents either only answered part a) and
c) of the question or gave an upper boundary that was below their perceived
inflation rate. These answers had to be excluded when analyzing the upper
boundary.
• When analyzing the lower boundary, 33 answers were of no use because ei-
ther only part a) and b) have been answered or the respondent gave a lower
boundary that was above the perceived inflation rate.
When all the incomplete answers and the outliers are excluded, the number of re-
sponses amounts to 352 for the estimation of the lower boundary and 369 answers
were in the data set for the estimation of the upper boundary. In the following,
we will denote by a the lower boundary which we obtain by subtracting for each
respondent the perceived inflation rate πp (answer given to question a)) from the
answer given to question c). This procedure yields values for a that lie between
-7 and 0. The upper boundary will be denoted by b and is calculated analogously
as the difference between the answer given to question b) and πp. Here, we obtain
values that range between 0 and 5.
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1.4.2 Estimation of the Just Noticeable Difference
According to the Weber-Fechner law expressed in equation (1.6), the just noticeable
difference should be a linear function of the actual inflation rate. As we observed a
large variety of inflation rates from all over the world, it is possible to estimate the
relationship and to formally test whether the Weber-Fechner law holds indeed for
the perception of changes in inflation.
Given the definitions of a and b, we can estimate the following two equations:
(1.10) a = δ0 + δ1π
p + εa
(1.11) b = γ0 + γ1π
p + εb,
where εa and εb are the errors of the regression. The results including standard
errors in parentheses are summarized in table 1.5 and depicted in figures 1.3 and
1.4. A ? indicates significance at the 5% level.
δ̂0 δ̂1 R
2
Lower boundary a −0.1388?
(0.0567)
−0.1475?
(0.0113)
0.3285
γ̂0 γ̂1 R
2
Upper boundary b 0.3288?
(0.0664)
0.1312?
(0.0136)
0.2024
Table 1.5: Estimates of the just noticeable difference
As the estimated parameters are all significant, we conclude that the Weber-
Fechner law holds for the perception of changes in inflation. Our results show that
the upper and lower boundaries are linear functions of the inflation rate prevailing at
the time the expectations are queried. Even though these boundaries are obtained
from a cross-sectional estimation, we will interpret them in section 1.4.4 as evidence
for a time-varying just noticeable difference with a and b depending on the inflation
rate that prevails at the time expectations are formed. If, for example, perceived
inflation is 3%, an expected increase of the inflation rate of 0.72 percentage points
is needed to make the respondents mark UP in the questionnaire. By contrast, a
decrease of the inflation rate of 0.58 percentage points must be expected to make the
respondent mark DOWN. Note that Weber (1834) and Fechner (1889) originally did
not allow for a constant term in their relationship of perception and base stimulus.
As opposed to physical stimuli like weight and sound, there exists no situation where
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Figure 1.3: Estimation of the lower boundary
the base stimulus is not present in the case of the inflation rate. Thus, it is possible to
interpret the intercept as the just noticeable difference when the perceived inflation
rate is 0%. Moreover, our estimates can even be used when perceived inflation rates
are negative. Specifically, the upper (lower) boundary is positive (negative) as long
as πp is greater than −2.51% (−0.94%). For values of πp below these critical values,
however, the boundaries turn upside down.
In addition to formally testing the Weber-Fechner law, the responses to our
additional question can also be used to investigate whether the perception of changes
in inflation indeed follows a symmetric pattern. In this context, in the literature,
the assumption of a normal distribution is sometimes replaced by other asymmetric
distributional assumptions like the non-central t-distribution in Berk (1999). A first
hint that inflationary changes are perceived asymmetrically, is given by the fact that
only about 60% of the respondents gave a symmetric indifference interval, whereas
26% (14%) gave an upper value that was larger (smaller) than the lower boundary in
absolute values. The fact that there were more respondents indicating a larger upper
value is reflected in our finding that |γ0| > |δ0|. For the boundaries of the indifference
interval, this finding together with the non-zero constant implies that b > −a as long
as perceived inflation is lower than 11.66%. However, we can’t conclude from this,
that people react less sensitively to an expected rise in the inflation rate than to
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Figure 1.4: Estimation of the upper boundary
a fall, because it is not clear whether the difference in the absolute values of the
constants and the slope coefficients are significant. We can test for asymmetries in
a more formal way by running a pooled regression of the following type:
(1.12) |x| = φ0 + φ1d + φ3πp + φ4πpd + εx.
The vector x contains the values of a and b; d is a dummy variable that is equal to one
if x = a and zero otherwise; εx is the error term. If the estimated coefficients shown
in table 1.5 are statistically identical, then both coefficients φ1 and φ4 should not
be significant. The p-values we obtained are 0.03 for φ1 and 0.36 for φ4. Thus, the
lower boundary is significantly smaller than the upper boundary by a constant value
of about 0.3288− 0.1388 ≈ 0.2 percentage points. However, the slope coefficients in
equations (1.10) and (1.11) are not statistically different. This can be seen from the
high p-value associated with φ4. Thus, we conclude that the asymmetrical behavior
does not change for different πp and the difference between the absolute values of
the boundaries a and b stays constant. It follows that respondents seem to react
more sensitively to an expected fall of the inflation rate than to a rise.
Another point that can be made here is that the linear fit of the OLS regressions
in table 1.5 might not give a good approximation of the just noticeable difference.
1.4. SURVEY-BASED DETERMINATION OF THE JUST NOTICEABLE
DIFFERENCE 21
2 4 6 8 10
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
φ a
π*
∧
2 4 6 8 10
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
φ b
π*
∧
Figure 1.5: Linearity of the Weber-Fechner law
It may be the case that respondents from countries with a low perceived inflation
rate may form a different attitude towards expected changes of the inflation rate
than respondents from countries experiencing high inflation. This would imply that
the slope coefficient varies with the perceived inflation rate, which would give rise to
non-linearities. To elaborate on this, we run a series of regressions of the following
type:
(1.13) a = δ0 + δ1π
p + φadaπ
p + εa
(1.14) b = γ0 + γ1π
p + φbdbπ
p + εb,
where da (db) is a dummy vector in which the i-th row dai = 1 (dbi = 1) if π
p
i ≥ π∗.
The index i refers to an individual respondent. π∗ rises from 1% to 10% in steps
of 0.1 so that the division line between countries with low inflation and countries
with high inflation is variable. For each regression we record φ̂a and φ̂b as well as
the respective 95% confidence bands. The results are summarized in figure 1.5. The
left panel shows that φ̂a is not significantly different from zero irrespective of the
value of π∗. This clearly indicates that a linear fit is appropriate for the estimation
of the lower boundary. The right panel shows the results for the upper boundary.
Here, φ̂b turns out to be positive and significant for values of π
∗ between 2.6% and
5.3% and for values of π∗ between 6.6% and 8.8%. In order to use these results
for the calculation of the upper boundary, a decision has to be made on the value
of π∗. Using the highest R2 as criterion, π∗ = 5% which results in the estimates
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γ̂0 γ̂1 φ̂b R
2
Upper boundary b 0.5833?
(0.0920)
−0.0046
(0.0371)
0.1221?
(0.0311)
0.2345
Table 1.6: Linearity of the Weber-Fechner law (π∗ = 5%)
shown in table 1.6. Note that standard errors are given in parentheses. A ? indicates
significance at the 5% level.
As γ̂1 is insignificant, the results imply that for values of π
p
i < 5% the upper
boundary of the just noticeable difference is constant and does not rise with the
perceived inflation rate. By contrast, for values of πpi ≥ 5% the slope coefficient
φ̂b becomes positive and significant so that the upper boundary increases with the
perceived inflation rate. Interestingly, φ̂b is statistically indifferent from γ̂1 of the
baseline regression (1.11). Although we could conclude that there is some evidence
of a non-linear relationship between the upper boundary of the just noticeable differ-
ence and the perceived inflation rate, we decided to use the linear baseline regression
(1.11) for the conversion of qualitative expectations into quantitative measures be-
low in section 1.4.4. This basically has two reasons. First, equation (1.14) is just one
formulation of a non-linear regression model among many possible models. Thus,
further research on the theoretical foundations of the evolution of the just noticeable
difference would be needed in order to specify a model that allows for deviations
from the linear Weber-Fechner law. Second, the improvement in terms of R2’s when
using equation (1.14) instead of equation (1.11) is only 1.6% and in our view too
small in order to justify a more complicated behavioral model.
Apart from testing for non-linearities, the answers to our additional question
can be used to investigate whether or not the just noticeable difference varies across
countries. Equations (1.10) and (1.11) are estimated from a cross section and it
is assumed that the only source of variation in the just noticeable difference is the
perceived inflation rate. There may however be one good reason to suppose that the
estimated results might suffer from an omitted variable bias because of unobserved
heterogeneity. If agents were used to live in an environment with a high average level
of inflation over a long period of time, they might have a lower sensibility towards
changes in inflation than those who have never been faced with high inflation rates.
Even though in 2004 only 10 percent of the countries in our sample experienced
inflation rates of above 10 percent (and below 22 percent), this share has been
much higher in the preceding decades. In 48 countries the average inflation rate
between 1973 and 1990 was above 10 percent, and in 18 countries inflation even
exceeded 50 percent.12 In order to test whether the inflationary history of a country
12For the Eastern European countries and the countries of the former Soviet Union the average
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has any specific impact on the just noticeable difference of the respondents, we
additionally controlled for it and re-estimated equations (1.10) and (1.11). As it
is a stylized fact that the variability of inflation is positively correlated with the
average level of inflation, the inflationary history of each country was approximated
by the average standard deviation of the annual inflation rates between 1973 and
1990. The results including standard errors in parentheses are shown in table 1.7.
A ? indicates significance at the 5% level.
δ̂0 δ̂1 δ̂2 R
2
Lower boundary a −0.1320?
(0.0561)
−0.1375?
(0.0115)
−0.00047?
(0.00013)
0.3484
γ̂0 γ̂1 γ̂2 R
2
Upper boundary b 0.3227?
(0.0658)
0.1204?
(0.0139)
0.00040?
(0.00013)
0.2232
Table 1.7: Controlling for country-specific inflationary history
The estimated coefficients for the impact of the inflationary history δ̂2 and γ̂2
are significant and show the expected sign. Therefore, the just noticeable difference
has to be adjusted for an additional country-specific constant term that decreases the
lower boundary and that increases the upper boundary. Compared with the base-
line estimates shown in table 1.5 the goodness-of-fit of both regressions improves by
roughly 2 percentage points. The magnitude of the country effect, however, is so
small that in the end we decided not to consider it when converting the qualitative
expectations into quantitative measures below in section 1.4.4. For the UK, for in-
stance, where inflation exhibited the highest standard deviation in 1973-90 (5.65%)
among the countries investigated in section 1.3, the lower (upper) boundary a (b)
would have to be corrected by -0.0026 (0.0022). Note also that the estimated param-
eters of the Weber-Fechner law (δ̂0, δ̂1, γ̂0 and γ̂1) are statistically indifferent from
the baseline estimates shown in table 1.5 as they are within the 95% confidence
band.
1.4.3 Identifying the Basis of the Expectation Formation
Process
From part a) of our additional question we can finally infer the inflation rate which
was perceived by the respondents at the time they filled in the CESifo WES ques-
tionnaire (between July 05 and July 15, 2004). On the basis of these answers, we are
inflation rate between 1991 and 1995 was used to calculate these figures. The source of the annual
inflation rates are the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
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able to detect the average information lag of the respondents and, hence, the basis
on which they form expectations. As the variation of the answers for each country is
large, we use measures of average deviation. The root mean squared error (RMSE)
and the mean absolute error (MAE) can be calculated such that they measure the
deviation of the inflation rate reported in response to question a) from the reference
inflation rate prevailing in the current and previous quarters and months of 2004.
For the non-OECD countries in our sample the data was taken from the Interna-
tional Financial Statistics of the IMF. The main difference between the RMSE and
the MAE is that the RMSE puts more weight on deviations that are large.
MAE RMSE
M6 2004 1.17 M6 2004 1.84
M5 2004 1.14 M5 2004 1.83
M4 2004 1.22 M4 2004 1.94
M3 2004 1.35 M3 2004 2.03
M2 2004 1.40 M2 2004 2.20
M1 2004 1.44 M1 2004 2.70
Q2 2004 1.06 Q2 2004 1.74
Q1 2004 1.29 Q1 2004 2.01
Q4 2003 1.58 Q4 2003 2.43
Table 1.8: Identifying the basis for inflation expectations
The calculation of the errors, which are presented in table 1.8, shows that
the smallest error is calculated for the second quarter of 2004 for both measures
when the analysis is done on a quarterly basis. On a monthly basis, the results
are qualitatively the same. The values for the RMSE and the MAE suggest that
the smallest error emerges if May 2004 is taken as a reference. Nevertheless, the
smallest MAE is indicated for the second quarter of 2004 and the RMSE for May
2004 is only slightly below the one calculated for the second quarter 2004.
Interestingly, both, the MAE and the RMSE are smaller for the quarterly
series. From this and from the fact that inflation expectations of the CESifo WES
are 6-months-ahead inflation expectations which are queried every three months
in the first two weeks of January, April, July and October, we conclude that a
quarterly perspective seems most appropriate. The information set that is available
to the survey respondents at the time they fill in the questionnaire is the past quarter
(that is the first quarter for the questionnaires returned at the beginning of April,
the second quarter for the questionnaires returned at the beginning of July, and so
on). Thus, the July survey produces inflation expectations Etπt+2, where t refers to
the second quarter and t + 2 to the fourth quarter.
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1.4.4 Application to the CESifo WES
Given the basis of the expectation formation process and the survey-based estimates
of the just noticeable difference, it is now possible to convert qualitative inflation
expectations for every country considered by the CESifo WES into quantitative
measures of expectations using equation (1.3). The upper and lower boundary of
the indifference interval are calculated according to
at = δ̂0 + δ̂1πt and bt = γ̂0 + γ̂1πt
with δ̂0, δ̂1, γ̂0 and γ̂1 taken from table 1.5. Thus, we assume that these behavioral
parameters are equal across countries and across agents, that they are asymmetric
for the upper and lower boundary, and that the just noticeable difference only varies
proportionally with the basis of the expectation formation process πt.
The results of the conversion together with the balance statistic are shown in
figures 1.6 and 1.7. Note that the outliers resulting from small sample sizes still occur
in France (2001:1), Italy (1996:4) and the UK (1991:4), despite our adjustments
described in appendix 1.A.
1.4.5 Unbiasedness of Expectations
With the quantified inflation expectations at hand, it is now possible to test whether
or not expectations are unbiased predictors of future realizations. While the tradi-
tional conversion methods impose the unbiasedness of expectations, our approach
allows to test for this property. The reason why we are questioning this assumption
is the mixed evidence reported in the literature. Many papers that have examined
quantitative survey measures of inflation expectations (which were directly queried
like in the US-based Livingston or Michigan survey and which have not been con-
verted from qualitative data) have concluded that these expectations are biased
forecasts of inflation (see Roberts (1997) and the papers cited there).
The unbiasedness of expectations constitutes a necessary condition for rational
expectations in the sense of Muth (1961). Unbiasedness implies that the forecast
error should, on average, be equal to zero. For a forecast horizon of two quarters
this hypothesis is typically tested by estimating the following equation:
(1.15) πt − Et−2πt = c + ut.
If the null hypothesis that c = 0 can be rejected at reasonable levels, we conclude
that expectations were indeed biased. The results of this regression for all con-
version methods applied in this paper are given in table 1.9. The p-values for the
t-tests which have been calculated using Newey-West standard errors to correct for
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Figure 1.6: Quantification with the survey-based method
overlapping forecast errors, are reported in brackets. A ? indicates significance at
the 5% level.
The unbiasedness tests for the inflation expectations obtained from the Carlson-
Parkin method and the Weber-Fechner method show that all constant terms are close
to zero and insignificant at the 5% level. Of course, this result does not come as a
surprise as the unbiasedness is a crucial assumption for each method. The unbiased-
ness tests for the regression approach are presented in the next two columns. As far
as OLS results are concerned, they yield perfectly unbiased expectations. This is
due to the fact that the expectation error is identical to the estimated error ε̂t of the
OLS regression.13 The time-varying parameters approach yields very similar results
13See equation (1.8) and footnote 9 in section 1.3.2. In the cases of France and Italy we get
a point estimate that deviates from zero because the dummy variable that we included for the
estimation of the boundaries is not taken into account when calculating expectations.
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Figure 1.7: Quantification with the survey-based method ctd.
with all the estimates being close to zero and insignificant at the 5% level. Note,
that the smoothed component of the boundaries is used to calculate expectations.
In the last column of table 1.9 we present the results for the survey-based
method. In fact, it turns out that for two out of the seven countries inflation
expectations were biased during the period 1991:2 to 2004:2. Here, Italy and the
US do not fulfill the necessary condition for rationality.14 This finding is very much
in line with our conjecture in section 1.3.1 where we argued that the negative just
noticeable difference for these countries that has been derived from the Carlson-
Parkin method is a result of ‘bad’ expectations or, to put it more concretely, of
expectations that were biased upwards throughout the period of disinflation in the
14Using the Livingston Survey of Professional Forecasters (which queries quantitative inflation
expectations) Adam and Padula (2003) find that expectations in the US were indeed biased during
the nineties.
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Country Carlson- Weber- Regression Survey-
Parkin Fechner OLS TVP based
Euro Zone: −0.01
[0.92]
−0.06
[0.29]
0.00
[1.00]
−0.01
[0.62]
−0.06
[0.42]
France: 0.03
[0.86]
−0.01
[0.86]
−0.04
[0.54]
−0.04
[0.31]
−0.08
[0.34]
France:♦ 0.01
[0.95]
0.02
[0.86]
0.00
[1.00]
−0.01
[0.75]
Germany: −0.02
[0.86]
−0.07
[0.58]
0.00
[1.00]
−0.01
[0.83]
0.05
[0.78]
Italy: 0.03
[0.99]
−0.10
[0.82]
0.07
[0.38]
0.01
[0.82]
−0.22?
[0.04]
Italy:♦ 0.00
[0.99]
−0.12
[0.18]
0.00
[1.00]
−0.01
[0.73]
Japan: 0.03
[0.73]
−0.02
[0.85]
0.00
[1.00]
−0.00
[1.00]
−0.13
[0.13]
UK: 0.11
[0.63]
0.02
[0.90]
0.00
[1.00]
0.00
[0.94]
−0.22
[0.24]
UK:♦ 0.12
[0.72]
0.73
[0.42]
0.00
[1.00]
0.00
[0.98]
US: 0.06
[0.66]
−0.02
[0.90]
0.00
[1.00]
−0.00
[1.00]
−0.45?
[0.00]
Note: For the countries in which outliers occurred due to the conversion of in-
flation expectations from qualitative into quantitative data the analysis of the
forecast error was done with and without dummy variable. In case the dummy
variable was included, we used the indifference bands that were calculated ex-
cluding the outliers. A ♦ marks the estimations where no dummy variable was
included.
Table 1.9: Unbiasedness tests
beginning of the 1990s. The negative sign of the constant confirms this conjecture.
In general, table 1.9 reveals that with the traditional methods we are not capable of
testing the unbiasedness of expectations or do any inference on rational expectations.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper presents a new methodology for the determination of the just noticeable
difference, which is required for the quantification of qualitative survey data. Tradi-
tional conversion methods, such as the probability approach of Carlson and Parkin
(1975), the regression method of Pesaran (1984) or the time-varying parameters
model of Seitz (1988), require very restrictive assumptions concerning the proper-
ties of the just noticeable difference and the expectation formation process of survey
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respondents. The novelty of the present paper is that we convert qualitative survey
responses into quantitative measures for inflation expectations without having to
rely on these assumptions. In contrast to the three traditional methods we do not
implicitly derive the just noticeable difference from the qualitative survey responses
and from the statistical properties of the reference time-series, but from a special
question in the July 2004 CESifo WES, in which we directly query the repondents’
boundaries of the indifference interval for a given current inflation rate. This new
methodology, which we labeled survey-based approach, was then applied to expec-
tations about the future development of inflation which are included in the CESifo
WES.
The major advantage of our approach is that we can explicitly test whether or
not the assumptions made in the traditional conversion methods are valid. Specifi-
cally, we addressed the following issues:
• are the boundaries symmetric and constant over time;
• if not, what are the determinants of the boundaries;
• do the boundaries vary across countries;
• are expectations unbiased?
Concerning the first two issues, our main results are that boundaries are asym-
metric and time-varying. Respondents seem to react more sensitively to an expected
fall of the inflation rate than to a rise. Moreover, the boundaries turned out to be
an increasing function of the perceived current rate of inflation. With the Weber–
Fechner law we delivered a theoretic rationale for this relationship. Concerning the
third issue, we found that there are country-specific effects which are related to the
country’s inflationary history, but these effects are so small that we decided not to
consider them for the conversion. Concerning the final issue we showed that the
unbiasedness assumption that is made in all traditional conversion method holds for
a majority of the countries in our sample, but not for all.
Apart from the relaxation of some crucial assumptions underlying the tradi-
tional conversion methods, a more practical advantage of the survey-based method
is that the resulting time series for inflation expectations are not subject to revi-
sions. While in the traditional methods the just noticeable difference is recalculated
with every additional data point, in our approach the boundaries are exogenous to
qualitative expectations and only vary with the level of the current rate of inflation.
The problems related to the assumption of normally distributed survey re-
sponses remain unsolved by our approach. Like the traditional conversion methods,
the survey-based method uses the computed boundaries to divide the probability
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density function of the normal distribution into three sub-areas: expectations of a
lower, a constant and a higher future inflation rate. Problems emerge when there are
no survey participants in one of the categories. This situation appears quite often in
an expert survey such as the CESifo WES with a limited number of participants; so
that in the present paper, we only considered countries for which a critical number
of respondents was exceeded.
Appendix
1.A Corrections of the Microdata
A major shortcoming of the Carlson-Parkin method is the underlying assumption
that aggregate distribution of responses is approximated by a normal distribution.
There are three cases in which the calculation of a quantitative measure of inflation
expectations according to equation (1.3) becomes impossible:
• no respondent is within the category UP or DOWN,
• all respondents share the same opinion,
• no respondent is within the category SAME.
First, if UPt = 0 the value of Φ
−1(1 − UPt) approaches infinity, whereas the
value of Φ−1(DOt) approaches minus infinity whenever DOt = 0. If such a case
occurred, we corrected for that by adding 1/(2n + 1) to the category that is equal
to zero, with n being the number of respondents at time t, and by subtracting this
value from the opposite category. This can be justified by the fact that the answers
of the survey only approximate the basic population. With this correction we do
not fundamentally change the survey result as the number of respondents stays the
same when the corrected figures are rounded to nearest integer15.
Second, if either UPt = 1, or SAMEt = 1, or DOt = 1, we subtracted 1/(2n+
1) from the respective category. In contrast to the first case, the remaining two
categories are increased by only 1/[2(2n + 1)] so as to obtain a non-zero fraction in
every category.
15 Take the following outcome of the survey as an example: UPt = 0, SAMEt = 0.5, DOt = 0.5
and n = 10. Applying the correction mechanism yields the following adjusted fractions: UPt =
0.048, SAMEt = 0.5 and DOt = 0.452. For a number of ten respondents this gives 0.48 persons
expecting a rise in inflation which is equal to zero when rounded to nearest whole number, and
4.52 persons expecting a fall in inflation which can be rounded to 5.
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Third, if we obtain a value of SAMEt = 0, the denominator in formula (1.3)
is zero. To avoid this problem, we subtracted 1/[2(2n + 1)] from the UPt and DOt
fractions and added 1/(2n + 1) to the SAMEt fraction.
1.B Estimates of the Just Noticeable Difference from the
Time-Varying Parameters Method
In section 1.3.2 we calculated the permanent component of the just noticeable dif-
ference by implementation of the time-varying parameters model. For illustration
we depict these results in figure 1.8. The solid line shows the upper boundary b and
the dashed line shows the lower boundary a. A ♦ marks the cases where the outliers
are included into the regression.
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Figure 1.8: Just noticeable differences estimated with the time-varying parameters
method
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Chapter 2
The New Keynesian Phillips
Curve and the Role of
Expectations: Evidence from the
CESifo World Economic Survey
Abstract
We provide evidence on the fit of the hybrid New Keynesian Phillips
curve for selected Euro zone countries, the US and the UK. Instead of
imposing rational expectations and estimating the Phillips curve by the
Generalized Method of Moments, we use direct measures of inflation ex-
pectations from the CESifo World Economic Survey. Our main findings
are as follows: (i) The use of survey data gives empirical results, which
are more reliable than those obtained from the GMM approach. (ii)
The purely forward-looking Phillips curve can be rejected in favor of the
hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve. (iii) The estimated coefficients
on past inflation are higher when using survey expectations than when
using the rational expectations GMM approach. (iv) It remains unclear
whether real unit labor costs or a measure of the output gap should be
used as a proxy for real marginal costs. (v) Theory-based restrictions
lead to an improvement of the empirical results.
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2.1 Introduction
The relationship between inflation and real variables is of crucial importance for
understanding the effects of monetary policy on inflation. In recent years, some kind
of consensus has emerged, generally referred to as New Keynesian macroeconomics,
that integrates Keynesian elements (imperfect competition, nominal rigidities) into a
dynamic general equilibrium framework traditionally used in the Real Business Cycle
literature. The nature of inflation dynamics is arguably the most distinctive feature
of the New Keynesian paradigm. It is captured by the so-called New Keynesian
Phillips curve which is based on Calvo’s (1983) model of staggered price setting and
which expresses current inflation as a function of expected future inflation and a
measure of firms’ real marginal costs. While theoretically appealing, a number of
authors (e.g. Fuhrer and Moore, 1995) criticized this version of the Phillips curve
since the implied ‘jump’ behavior of inflation was completely at odds with the hump-
shaped behavior that can be observed in VAR analyses. As a consequence, Gaĺı and
Gertler (1999) extended Calvo’s theoretical framework to the so-called hybrid New
Keynesian Phillips curve (HNKPC) by allowing for a fraction of firms that set prices
according to a backward-looking rule-of-thumb.
The empirical findings are encouraging for the New Keynesian Phillips curve.
Empirical work mainly centers around the question of which variable to use for
measuring real activity and whether backward-looking behavior is relevant. Con-
cerning the first question, theory tells us that real marginal costs are the driving
force underlying changes in inflation. In a recent survey article Gaĺı (2003) empha-
sizes that empirical results are promising when the New Keynesian Phillips curve is
estimated in a way consistent with theory, implying that labor income share is used
instead of detrended GDP as a proxy for real marginal costs. Concerning the second
question he continues: “Although backward-looking behavior is often statistically
significant, it appears to have limited quantitative importance. In other words, al-
though the baseline purely forward-looking model is rejected on statistical grounds,
it is still likely to be a reasonable first approximation to the inflation dynamics of
both Europe and the United States.” (ibid., p. 162).
The standard econometric tool for estimating the New Keynesian Phillips curve
is the Instrumental Variables technique or, more generally, the Generalized Method
of Moments (GMM). Expectations about future variables are replaced by their ex-
post realizations, and expectational errors are assumed to be uncorrelated with all
variables in the information set of agents available at the time expectations are
formed. In other words, expectations are assumed to be rational. There is, however,
an ongoing debate in the recent literature about the appropriateness of the GMM
technique. As mentioned by Mavroeidis (2005) and Rudd and Whelan (2005), GMM
estimates may overstate the degree of forward-looking behavior if the Phillips curve
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model is mis-specified.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. On a theoretical level we derive the
HNKPC under the assumption that firms have subjective expectations that may be
non-rational. Available evidence from surveys suggests that inflation expectations
are often biased and inefficient predictors of future inflation, thereby questioning
the assumption of rationality (see Roberts, 1997, and the papers cited there). We
extend the theoretical framework developed by Adam and Padula (2003) by allow-
ing for the existence of both, forward-looking and backward-looking firms. On an
empirical level we follow Roberts (1997) and Adam and Padula (2003) and estimate
the Phillips curve for selected Euro zone countries, the US and the UK by using
direct measures of inflation expectations, instead of imposing rational expectations
and estimating the Phillips curve by GMM. The data source is the CESifo World
Economic Survey which quarterly polls economic experts about their expected fu-
ture development of inflation. Our main findings are as follows: (i) The use of survey
data gives empirical results, which are more reliable than those obtained from the
rational expectations GMM approach. We show that OLS parameters are stable
over time and endogeneity of regressors can be rejected. (ii) The purely forward-
looking Phillips curve can be rejected in favor of the hybrid New Keynesian Phillips
curve. (iii) The estimated coefficients on past inflation are higher when using survey
expectations than when using the rational expectations GMM approach. (iv) It
remains unclear whether real unit labor costs or a measure of the output gap should
be used as a proxy for real marginal costs. (v) Theory-based restrictions lead to an
improvement of the empirical results.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2.2 we present the standard
version of the HNKPC that results from a rational expectations approach and we
modify it in a way that accounts for subjective and potentially non-rational expec-
tations of firms. Section 2.3 gives an overview of the data. The main focus is on the
presentation of the inflation expectations from the CESifo WES, but we also briefly
discuss the variables used as proxies for real marginal costs. Our estimation results
and a comparison with other empirical work (mainly using the rational expectations
approach) are presented in sections 2.4 and 2.5. Finally, section 2.6 summarizes the
main results and concludes.
2.2 The Hybrid New Keynesian Phillips Curve
2.2.1 Rational Expectations
The version of the HNKPC that is mostly used in the literature has been introduced
by Gaĺı and Gertler (1999) and extended by Gaĺı, Gertler, and López-Salido (2001).
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It is based on Calvo’s (1983) staggered price setting framework in which each firm has
a probability 1−θ of being able to reset its price in any given period, independently
of the time elapsed since the most recent price adjustment. In contrast to Calvo
(1983), however, they assume that of those firms being able to adjust prices in a
given period, there is only a fraction of firms 1 − ω that sets prices optimally in
a forward-looking manner. The remaining part uses a rule-of-thumb that simply
augments last period’s average reset price by the inflation rate prevailing in that
period. It can then be shown that the HNKPC is given by
(2.1) πt = γfEt[πt+1] + γbπt−1 + λmct
where πt denotes the inflation rate, E[·] the rational expectations operator, and mct
the logarithm of real marginal costs, and where the coefficients can be expressed in
terms of the structural parameters
γf =
βθ
θ + ω[1− θ(1− β)] ,
γb =
ω
θ + ω[1− θ(1− β)] ,
λ =
(1− ω)(1− θ)(1− βθ)
θ + ω[1− θ(1− β)] .
β is the discount factor of the firms’ intertemporal maximization problem. An im-
portant assumption underlying the derivation of the structural parameters is that
firms operate under monopolistic competition with a Cobb-Douglas production tech-
nology and constant returns to scale. If returns to scale are decreasing, Gaĺı, Gertler,
and López-Salido (2001) showed that λ additionally becomes a function of the labor
elasticity of production and the price elasticity of demand.
This very general formulation of the Phillips curve comprises two special cases.
First, the discount factor β can be restricted to unity, γf + γb = 1, which implies
that in the long-run the Phillips curve is vertical. Second, when ω = 0 all firms set
their prices optimally and the model converges to the purely forward-looking New
Keynesian Phillips curve (γf = β, γb = 0, λ = [(1− θ)(1− βθ)]/θ).
2.2.2 Subjective Expectations
As in the previous section we distinguish between two groups of firms: forward-
looking firms which set prices according to an intertemporal optimization procedure,
and backward-looking firms which set prices according to a simple rule-of-thumb.
The main difference to the previous section is the way forward-looking firms form
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their expectations. Instead of imposing rational expectations (i.e. all firms form
expectations homogenously, using the same model and the same information set),
we allow for subjective expectations of each single forward-looking firm, which may
be rational or not and which may be heterogeneous across firms.
In the following we will derive the HNKPC under the assumption that firms
form subjective expectations. We will extend the theoretical framework of Adam
and Padula (2003) by explicitly introducing backward-looking firms. In contrast to
their paper which describes the price-setting behavior of firms from the point of view
of professional forecasters, we assume that the source of potential non-rationalities in
expectations are the firms themselves. This has the advantage that we can continue
to distinguish between two types of firms as in the case of rational expectations.
In accordance with the rational expectations approach, the starting point is
Calvo’s (1983) staggered price setting framework, which defines the log of the ag-
gregate price level pt as
(2.2) pt = (1− θ)p∗t + θpt−1,
where p∗t is the average reset price and 1− θ the probability that firms reset prices.
The average reset price is a weighted sum of the average price set by forward-looking
firms and the average price set by backward-looking firms
(2.3) p∗t = (1− ω)
1
I
I∑
i=1
pf,it + ω
1
J
J∑
i=1
pb,it ,
where I (J) is the number of forward-looking (backward-looking) firms, ω the frac-
tion of backward-looking firms (ω = J/(I + J)), and pb,it (p
f,i
t ) the price set by the
backward-looking (forward-looking) firm i. All firms which set prices in a backward-
looking manner, follow an identical rule-of-thumb according to which last period’s
average reset price is simply corrected by lagged inflation. Forming the average of
all backward-looking firms gives
(2.4) pbt =
1
J
J∑
i=1
pb,it = p
∗
t−1 + πt−1.
Firms which behave in a forward-looking manner, maximize expected discounted
profits given technology, factor prices and the constraint on price adjustment (de-
fined by 1− θ) which results in the following log-linear rule:
pf,it = (1− βθ)F it [
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k(mct+k + pt+k)] =
= (1− βθ)(mct + pt) + βθF it [pf,it+1],(2.5)
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where F it [·] denotes the subjective expectations operator of firm i.1 While individual
firms produce differentiated products under monopolistic competition, they are all
assumed to have the same Cobb-Douglas production technology and to face demand
curves with constant and equal demand elasticities. The crucial problem now is the
aggregation of individual prices set by forward-looking firms. Following Adam and
Padula (2003) we assume that firm i forms expectations about other firms’ optimum
prices and aggregates them to the average forward-looking price:
(2.6) F it [p
f
t+1] = F
i
t [
1
I
I∑
h=1
pf,ht+1].
Defining the average current forward-looking price by
(2.7) pft =
1
I
I∑
h=1
pf,ht
and assuming that the ‘law of iterated expectations’ holds, which implies that agents
do not expect that current forecasts of future variables z will be revised in a partic-
ular direction in the next period, i.e.:
(2.8) F it [F
h
t+1[zt+s]− F ht [zt+s]] = 0 ∀ i, h, s > 0,
Adam and Padula (2003) show that equation (2.6) can be expressed as
(2.9) F it [π
f
t+1] = (1− βθ)(F it [pft+1]−mct − pt),
where πft+1 = p
f
t+1−pft . In order to get this equation they take the difference between
equation (2.6) and (2.7), replaced pf,ht with the first expression of equation (2.5) and
applied the law of iterated expectations (see appendix 2.A).
Combining equations (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4) gives a relationship between pft and
pt (see appendix 2.B),
(2.10) pft =
pt + (θω − 2ω − θ)pt−1 + ωpt−2
(1− θ)(1− ω) ,
which can be shifted one period forward by applying the F it [·] operator:
(2.11) F it [p
f
t+1] =
F it [pt+1] + (θω − 2ω − θ)pt + ωpt−1
(1− θ)(1− ω) .
1Apart from the F it [·] operator, equation (2.5) is identical with the optimum pricing rule under
rational expectations. For a derivation see Gaĺı and Gertler (1999) and Gaĺı, Gertler, and López-
Salido (2001).
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Inserting equations (2.10) and (2.11) into equation (2.9) and aggregating over all
subjective expectations, F̄t[·] = (1/I)
∑I
i=1 F
i
t [·], finally gives the HNKPC based on
average subjective expectations (see appendix 2.C),
(2.12) πt = γf F̄t[πt+1] + γbπt−1 + λmct,
where πt = pt − pt−1. Note that equation (2.12) is identical with the specification
derived under rational expectations, except for the way expectations are formed.
2.3 Data Description
2.3.1 Inflation Expectations from the CESifo World Eco-
nomic Survey
Subjective inflation expectations are taken from the CESifo World Economic Survey
(WES) which assesses trends in the world economy by polling transnational as well as
national organizations worldwide about economic developments. It is conducted in
co-operation of Ifo Institute for Economic Research and the International Chamber
of Commerce (ICC) in Paris. The questionnaire of the WES, which is distributed
every quarter (January, April, July and October) and which was first conducted
in March 1983, asks participants to give their assessment of the general economic
situation and expectations regarding important macroeconomic indicators of the
country they inhabit. Currently, the WES asks about 1100 experts in 90 countries.
A question on the expected inflation rate, which is in the focus of the present
paper, was only included since July 1991. Survey participants are asked to give
their expectations on the inflation rate by the end of the next six months. They
indicate UP for an expected rise in the inflation rate, SAME for no change in the
inflation rate and DOWN for an expected fall in the inflation rate by the end of
the next six months. The questionnaire therefore reveals qualitative information on
the participants’ expectations, which we transformed into a time series of expected
cardinal inflation rates by applying a variant of the probability approach of Carlson
and Parkin (1975).
The probability approach assumes that the median expectations of the re-
spondents sampled are normally distributed and that respondents report expected
changes only if these changes are above or below a certain threshold. To derive an
estimate of these thresholds, which define the so-called indifference interval, it is
further assumed that they are symmetric around zero and constant across time and
individuals. The indifference interval is then calculated in such a way that through-
out the observation period the constructed expected inflation rates are on average
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equal to the actual inflation rates. This implies a priori that inflation expectations
are unbiased predictors of future inflation, which is a necessary condition for ra-
tionality. In Henzel and Wollmershäuser (2005) we presented a new methodology
for the determination of the thresholds of the indifference interval that avoids this
assumption. Instead of deriving these thresholds by imposing that the constructed
expected inflation rates are on average equal to the actual inflation rates, we di-
rectly queried them from the survey respondents by a special question in the CESifo
WES. The main results are that the thresholds are asymmetric and time-varying.
Respondents seem to react more sensitively to an expected fall of the inflation rate
than to a rise. Moreover the thresholds turned out to be an increasing function of
the perceived current rate of inflation.2
The converted inflation expectations and the actual inflation rate for Ger-
many, France, Italy, the Euro zone3, the UK and the US are shown in figure 2.1.
Inflation rates are taken from the OECD database, except for Euro zone inflation,
which was taken from Eurostat. Note that there are two outliers in the expectations
time-series, namely in France (third quarter of 2000) and in Italy (second quarter of
1996), for which we controlled in our empirical analysis below by adding a dummy
variable to the regression. The occurrence of these outliers is an unavoidable short-
coming of all conversion methods, when at a given point in time the assumption
of normally distributed survey responses is violated.4 Inflation expectations from
the CESifo WES are 6-months-ahead inflation expectations which are queried every
three months in the first two weeks of January, April, July and October. In Henzel
and Wollmershäuser (2005) we showed that the information set that is available to
the survey respondents at the time they fill in the questionnaire is the past quarter
(that is the first quarter for the questionnaires returned at the beginning of April,
the second quarter for the questionnaires returned at the beginning of July, and so
on). Thus, the April survey produces inflation expectations F̄tπt+2, where t refers
to the first quarter and t + 2 to the third quarter. As in a quarterly Phillips curve
model, the required expectation’s horizon should be a quarter of a year, it would
be more convenient to use the CESifo WES 6-months-ahead inflation expectations
together with semiannual data. In order to see whether the frequency of the data
2If, for example, perceived inflation is 1% (10%), an expected increase of the inflation rate of 0.46
(1.64) percentage points is needed to make the survey respondents mark UP in the questionnaire.
By contrast, a decrease of the inflation rate of 0.29 (1.61) percentage points must be expected to
make them mark DOWN.
3Euro zone inflation expectations have been calculated as a weighted sum of the responses for the
individual member countries. The weights are the country weights used by Eurostat to calculate
the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices for the Euro zone. See Henzel and Wollmershäuser
(2005) for further details.
4In the case of France, for example, in the October 2000 survey 13 out of 21 respondents
indicated UP and 7 indicated DOWN. The problem was that only 1 respondent expected inflation
to remain the same, which is a clear violation of the normality assumption.
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Figure 2.1: Actual inflation (πt, solid line) and expected inflation (F̄tπt+2, dashed
line), in percent
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matters for the empirical results, we ran regressions using both, quarterly and semi-
annual data. As the estimated coefficients were almost identical, we decided to
present only the results of the regressions that were obtained using quarterly data.
By using the 6-months-ahead inflation expectations as proxies for 3-month expecta-
tions we implicitly assumed that forecaster’s expectations are the same for each of
the two upcoming 3-month periods (see also Roberts, 1997, on this point).
As most of the countries considered in this paper belonged to the European
Monetary System, the data starts in the first quarter of 1993 in order to exclude
the crisis which took place in September 1992. Compared to most other empirical
Phillips curve studies this rather short estimation period is a novelty (see table 2.13
in appendix 2.F for a summary of other papers).
Using survey data for inflation expectations – instead of imposing rational
expectations – when estimating a Phillips curve relationship should only produce
different results, if survey expectations are not being formed rationally. The reason
why we are questioning the rationality of survey expectations is due to the mixed ev-
idence reported in the literature. Most papers that have examined survey measures
of inflation expectations have concluded that these expectations are not rational
in the sense of Muth (1961) (see for example Roberts, 1997, and the papers cited
there).
A necessary condition for rational expectations is the unbiasedness of expecta-
tions. In order to find out whether CESifo WES expectations are unbiased predictors
of future inflation, we regressed the forecast error (defined as πt− F̄t−2πt) on a con-
stant c and tested whether it is significantly different from zero. Table 2.1 reveals
that in the Euro zone, France and Germany, inflation expectations were unbiased
during the period 1993:1 to 2004:2. By contrast, in the UK, the US and Italy expec-
tations do not fulfill the necessary condition for rationality.5 From the negative sign
of the constant, we can conclude that expectations were biased upwards throughout
the period of disinflation in the beginning of the 1990s.
A further necessary condition for rational expectations is the informational
efficiency of expectations which requires the forecast error to be orthogonal to the
information commonly available at time t− 2. A first indication for the inefficiency
of expectations is given by the p-values of the serial correlation LM-test in table
2.1, which indicate that – except for Italy and France – the residuals are not free of
autocorrelation.6 Autocorrelation in the forecast error implies that a shock to the
5Using the Livingston Survey of Professional Forecasters (which queries quantitative inflation
expectations) Adam and Padula (2003) also find that expectations in the US were biased during
the nineties.
6As the forecast horizon does not correspond to the frequency of the survey, shocks to the
inflation rate can not be taken into account until the second period after the forecast and the
same error may be repeated again. Thus, autocorrelation of order one in the error constitutes no
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Euro France Ger Italy UK US
zone -many
c 0.05
[0.46]
−0.04
[0.66]
0.13
[0.49]
−0.27
[0.03]
−0.37
[0.02]
−0.43
[0.00]
LM(2) 0.82 0.77 0.00 0.96 0.00 0.00
LM(4) 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.98 0.00 0.01
Notes: We set a dummy variable to control for the outliers in France (2000:2)
and Italy (1996:1) which are due to the conversion of inflation expectations from
qualitative into quantitative data. The p-values, which have been calculated
using Newey-West standard errors to correct for overlapping forecast errors, are
reported in brackets. The last two rows report p-values for an LM test for the
null hypothesis of no autocorrelation up to the second and fourth lag. Sample
period: 1993:1 - 2004:2.
Table 2.1: Unbiasedness of expectations
inflation rate or to some other economic variable was not taken into account when the
inflation forecast was made and that the same mistake was repeated in subsequent
periods. In other words, efficiency of expectations requires that the forecast could
not have been improved by adding additional information. In order to test for this,
the forecast error is regressed on a number of exogenous variables that are known
at time t − 2 and that are possibly relevant when forecasting inflation.7 Table 2.2
reports p-values related to χ2-statistics of a Wald test of the null hypothesis that
the coefficients on the aforementioned lags of these regressors are jointly equal to
zero. In the Euro zone, France, Germany, Italy and the UK lagged values of the
forecast error can explain the movement of the forecast error at the five percent level,
which is a hint that survey respondents seem to be sluggish when correcting their
expectations after having recognized the last forecast error. Also past inflation rates
are of explanatory use in all countries. This means that respondents underestimate
the inertia of the inflation rate. In none of the countries except France the output
gap has a significant influence, indicating that the respondents seem to take it into
account when forming their expectations. By contrast, real unit labor costs seem
irrationality.
7Our proceeding basically follows Roberts (1997) who introduced as potentially omitted vari-
ables the output gap as a measure of overall economic activity (see section 2.3.2 for a definition),
the inflation rate to capture the persistence of inflation, and the three-month interest rate as an
indicator for the stance of monetary policy. Since unit root tests indicated that the interest rates
are non-stationary, we used first differences. In addition to that, we included real unit labor costs
(see section 2.3.2 for a definition) and lagged terms of the forecast error. The explanatory power of
each group of variables (which comprises four lags of the variable under consideration) was tested
separately. The forecast error, real unit labor cost and the output gap enter the regression only
from t− 3 on, for reasons of overlapping forecast errors and because we assume a publication lag
of one quarter.
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to be omitted in the Euro zone, France, and the US. The three-month interest
rate helps explain the forecast error in Germany, Italy, UK and the US.8 Thus, the
efficiency tests show that the null hypothesis of orthogonality must be rejected for
all countries. This evidence suggests that the polled experts did not make efficient
use of all the information available at the time the expectations were formed. Taken
together, the results of the unbiasedness tests and efficiency tests conducted here lead
us to conclude that the survey expectations do not possess the properties implied
by Muth’s definition of rational expectations.
Country Error Inflation Output gap RULC 3M Rate
lags 3 to 6 lags 2 to 5 lags 3 to 6 lags 3 to 6 lags 2 to 5
Euro zone 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.04 0.17
France 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.43
Germany 0.03 0.01 0.60 0.07 0.00
Italy 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.08 0.02
UK 0.04 0.00 0.35 0.22 0.00
US 0.86 0.00 0.21 0.03 0.04
Notes: The table shows p-values for a heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consis-
tent (HAC) Wald-test on joint significance of each group of lagged variables (Error
= forecast error, RULC = real unit labor cost, 3M Rate = three-month nominal
interest rate). The dummy variables are set as described in the notes to table 2.1.
Sample period: 1993:1 - 2004:2.
Table 2.2: Efficiency tests
2.3.2 Measures for Real Marginal Costs
There has been an extensive discussion in the literature about the correct proxy
for real marginal costs (see for example Gaĺı and Gertler, 1999, Gaĺı, Gertler, and
López-Salido, 2001 and Sbordone, 2005). There are basically two candidates that are
considered: real unit labor costs and the output gap. The hypothesis that real unit
labor costs is a good proxy for real marginal costs can be justified by the assumption
that the production technology is Cobb-Douglas and that capital is constant over
time. Real marginal costs are then defined as the ratio of real wages to the marginal
product of labor
(2.13) MCt =
1
α
WtNt
PtYt
8Roberts (1997) and the studies cited there also find no support of the efficiency hypothesis for
the US. Adam and Padula (2003) come to the same conclusion. For the Euro zone Forsells and
Kenny (2004) who investigated qualitative inflation expectations from the European Commission’s
Consumer Survey also find that expectation were not efficient during the nineties.
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where α is the labor elasticity of production, Wt the nominal wage rate, Nt em-
ployment, Pt the price level, and Yt aggregate output. The second term on the
right-hand-side is typically referred to as the labor income share or real unit labor
costs. Log-linearizing equation (2.13) around the steady state gives
(2.14) mct = wt + nt − pt − yt
where lower case-letters denote the percentage deviation of a variable around its
steady state. Thus, under the assumption that α is constant over time, equation
(2.14) shows that real marginal costs and real unit labor costs move in a one-to-one
relation around their steady state.
While real unit labor costs are a direct measure of a firm’s real marginal costs,
it can be shown that under certain conditions the output gap is a close proxy.
We will not go into the details of the derivation of this relationship because it
has been well documented in standard textbooks on monetary economics (see for
example Walsh, 2003, chapter 5.4). The idea is that after combining the households’
labor supply decision (real wage equals the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and labor) with the firms’ price-setting condition (price equals a mark-
up over nominal marginal costs), an expression for the output level under both
flexible and rigid prices can be derived. Under the assumption that labor market
frictions exist but do not vary over time, real marginal costs are then a linear function
of the output gap xt
(2.15) mct = (σ + η)(yt − yflext ) = (σ + η)xt
where 1/σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, η the elas-
ticity of marginal disutility with respect to labor supply, and yflext the log of the
level of output that would prevail if prices were perfectly flexible (i.e. θ = 0). The
HNKPC then becomes
(2.16) πt = γf F̄t[πt+1] + γbπt−1 + λ′xt
where λ′ = λ(σ + η).
In our empirical analysis we consider both types of measures for real marginal
costs. Specifically we use
• the deviation of the logarithm of CPI-deflated unit labor costs (of the total
economy)9 from a linear trend (over the period 1990:1-2004:3): RULCt;
9Unit labor costs of the total economy are taken from the OECD database. Italian unit labor
costs are only available for the business sector (which is defined as total economy minus public
sector).
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Figure 2.2: GAPt (dashed line) and RULCt (continuous line), in percent
2.4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 47
• and the OECD output gap (as published in the OECD Economic Outlook,
Vol. 2004/2, No. 76):10 GAPt.
For each of the countries in our study, figure 2.2 shows both measures in a single
graph.
2.4 Empirical Results
We begin by presenting estimates for the purely forward-looking New Keynesian
Phillips curve which can be derived as a special case from the HNKPC by setting
ω = 0 (see table 2.3).
unrestricted restricted
(β = 0.99)
RULC GAP RULC GAP
β λ β λ′ λ λ′
Euro zone 1.03
[0.00]
0.16
[0.00]
1.02
[0.00]
−0.08
[0.25]
0.19
[0.00]
−0.10
[0.02]
France 0.97
[0.00]
0.08
[0.03]
1.00
[0.00]
0.03
[0.24]
0.07
[0.05]
0.03
[0.19]
Germany 1.07
[0.00]
0.36
[0.02]
1.05
[0.00]
−0.09
[0.62]
0.37
[0.03]
−0.12
[0.46]
Italy 0.91
[0.00]
0.02
[0.62]
0.89
[0.00]
−0.07
[0.41]
0.05
[0.41]
0.05
[0.58]
UK 0.85
[0.00]
−0.00
[0.99]
0.87
[0.00]
0.11
[0.01]
0.07
[0.19]
0.22
[0.00]
US 0.85
[0.00]
0.07
[0.16]
0.82
[0.00]
−0.06
[0.13]
0.13
[0.13]
0.14
[0.04]
Notes: Numbers in brackets are p-values which were calculated using HAC Newey-
West standard errors. For France and Italy we set a dummy variable in 2000:2
and 1996:1, respectively (see section 2.3.1). Sample period: 1993:1 - 2004:2.
Table 2.3: Estimation results for the forward-looking Phillips curve
10The OECD output gap is measured as the percentage difference between actual GDP in con-
stant prices and potential GDP. The latter is estimated by the OECD using a production function
approach, taking into account the capital stock, changes in labor supply, factor productivity and
underlying non–accelerating wage rates of unemployment (see Giorno et al., 1995). An alternative
measure of the output gap obtained from a Hodrick–Prescott–filtered GDP series gave results,
which are less favorable for the Phillips curve. While in the majority of cases the signs of the slope
coefficients were consistent with those obtained using the OECD output gap – in particular for the
hybrid NKPC – almost all slope coefficients turned out to be insignificant.
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In the purely forward-looking case the estimated parameter of inflation ex-
pectations is equal to the discount factor β. Irrespective of the model specification
the β’s are all statistically significant and in the neighborhood of one. Concerning
the slope coefficient λ our results are to some extent in line with those obtained
by Gaĺı, Gertler, and López-Salido (2001) who used a rational expectations-GMM
approach. While some of the estimated λ’s of the RULC model (Euro zone, France
and Germany) are positive and significant, the rest of the countries show no signif-
icant effect. The λ′ of the output gap model is positive and significant only for the
UK. For all other countries (except for France), it turns out to be negative, but the
influence on inflation is insignificant. These results are perfectly in line with the
cross correlations between inflation and RULC on the one hand, and inflation and
the output gap on the other hand (see figure 2.3). For k = 0 (that is, contempora-
neous correlation) λ is positive and significant only in those cases where correlations
in figure 2.2 are positive as well. Table 2.3 also shows that the results improve when
the estimation of the Phillips curve is restricted to β = 0.99. Except for the Euro
zone and Germany the negative slope coefficients become positive, and for the US
even significantly so.
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Note: The correlation coefficient is depicted on the vertical axis, and k on the horizontal axis.
Figure 2.3: Cross correlograms
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For most countries, however, the estimations of the purely forward-looking New
Keynesian Phillips curve produce residuals with a high degree of autocorrelation,
which indicates that some important explanatory variables are missing. We therefore
turn to the estimation of the HNKPC which explicitly allows lagged inflation to
have additional explanatory power for current inflation.11 Table 2.4 reveals that in
all of our estimations of the HNKPC the coefficients for both subjective inflation
expectations and lagged inflation are positive and significant. For most countries
the point estimates of γb turn out to be higher in the output gap model, whereas the
γf ’s are somewhat lower. Looking at the individual countries, we can distinguish
between three groups. In Germany and Italy the degree of backwardness is relatively
high. Irrespective of the measure for marginal costs, γb exceeds γf . In France the
opposite is true. The estimated γf ’s are higher than the γb’s, implying that French
firms are more forward-looking than their German or Italian competitors. In the
Euro zone as a whole, the US and – to some extent – the UK optimizing firms and
rule-of-thumb price setters are more or less balanced.
RULC GAP
γf γb λ γf γb λ
′
Euro zone 0.55
[0.00]
0.47
[0.00]
0.07
[0.04]
0.51
[0.00]
0.52
[0.00]
−0.00
[0.94]
France 0.78
[0.00]
0.21
[0.00]
0.06
[0.03]
0.76
[0.00]
0.25
[0.00]
0.04
[0.01]
Germany 0.29
[0.00]
0.74
[0.00]
0.08
[0.27]
0.28
[0.00]
0.78
[0.00]
0.04
[0.30]
Italy 0.25
[0.00]
0.72
[0.00]
−0.01
[0.47]
0.26
[0.00]
0.74
[0.00]
0.05
[0.00]
UK 0.49
[0.00]
0.43
[0.00]
−0.01
[0.83]
0.52
[0.00]
0.42
[0.00]
0.10
[0.00]
US 0.46
[0.00]
0.46
[0.00]
0.04
[0.07]
0.44
[0.00]
0.48
[0.00]
0.01
[0.70]
Notes: See table 2.3.
Table 2.4: Estimation results for the hybrid Phillips curve
The sign and significance of the measure for real marginal costs crucially de-
11Instead of introducing nominal rigidities in the price setting mechanism (i.e. rule-of-thumb
price setters) autocorrelated residuals could also be explained by persistent shocks to the mark-up
of firms over nominal marginal costs. Both modeling strategies would account for the empirical
fact that inflation is inertial (see de Walque et al., 2006, for a recent paper dealing with this issue).
While mark-up shocks seem to be the dominant source of inflation variability, their persistence
alone fails to capture the empirical evidence from VAR studies that the response of inflation to
shocks is gradual and hump-shaped (see Estrella and Fuhrer, 2002). According to the persistent
mark-up theory all firms completely front load changes in prices in response to news about future
profits, which leads to the typical jump behavior of aggregate inflation.
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pend on the empirical specification of the HNKPC and differ from the results ob-
tained from the estimation of the purely forward-looking Phillips curve. The most
striking result is that the output gap becomes an important explanatory variable
for inflation in France, Italy and – as in the forward-looking version – the UK,
which is astonishing, given the low and mostly negative contemporaneous correla-
tion between the output gap and inflation (see figure 2.3). From an econometric
point of view, the significant output gap coefficients can be explained by the high
correlation of the output gap with the unexplained part of a regression of inflation
on lagged and expected inflation. When RULC are used as a measure for marginal
costs, the results are more or less in line with those for the purely forward-looking
Phillips curve. The λ’s for the Euro zone and France remain positive and significant,
whereas λ for Germany becomes insignificant. These results are roughly in line with
the cross correlations we present in the upper part of figure 2.3.
RULC GAP
γf λ γf λ
′
Euro zone 0.52
[0.00]
0.08
[0.00]
0.49
[0.00]
−0.02
[0.32]
France 0.78
[0.00]
0.05
[0.05]
0.76
[0.00]
0.03
[0.04]
Germany 0.26
[0.00]
0.09
[0.24]
0.22
[0.00]
0.00
[0.94]
Italy 0.25
[0.00]
−0.01
[0.70]
0.26
[0.00]
0.06
[0.00]
UK 0.44
[0.00]
0.02
[0.42]
0.48
[0.00]
0.14
[0.00]
US 0.35
[0.00]
0.05
[0.20]
0.36
[0.00]
0.08
[0.01]
Notes: See table 2.3.
Table 2.5: Estimation results for the hybrid Phillips curve when γf + γb = 1
A necessary condition for the dynamic process to be stable is that the sum
of γf and γb does not exceed one. To be sure that the process is not exploding,
we also estimate a restricted version of the HNKPC where γf + γb = 1. Table 2.5
shows that the estimates of γf are still highly significant in every country. For the
Euro zone, France, Germany and Italy the imposed restriction leaves the estimates
of both, γf and λ/λ
′ more or less unchanged. By contrast, the restriction leads to
a positive slope in the RULC model for the UK and a positive and significant slope
in the GAP model for the US.
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2.5 Discussion of the Results
The following results can be summarized from the previous section. First, the
HNKPC performs better than the purely forward-looking Phillips curve. Not only
the estimates for γf , but also those for γb are positive and significantly different from
zero. Thus, there is a forward-looking and a backward-looking component of infla-
tion dynamics, which exhibits considerable variation between countries. Second, it
is unclear whether real unit labor costs or the output gap should be used as proxy
for real marginal costs. While for some countries (the Euro zone, France, Germany)
the first seems to be the driving variable of inflation, for other countries (Italy, the
UK, the US) the output gap is the appropriate measure. This shows that both are
only an imperfect proxy for the typically unobserved real marginal costs. Third,
theory-based restrictions (β = 0.99 and γf + γb = 1) lead to an improvement of the
empirical results. This is especially the case for the US and, to some extent, the UK
where the unrestricted estimates of β and γf + γb are significantly lower than 0.99
and 1.
In the following, we compare our results with those obtained in other empirical
studies. The direct use of measures for inflation expectations, which naturally avoids
any assumptions on the expectations formation process is much less popular than the
rational expectations approach. We only found five studies using either survey data
or OECD forecasts for expectations, which are summarized in table 2.12 in appendix
2.F. The great majority of empirical work on the New Keynesian Phillips curve
applies the rational expectations approach. Table 2.13 in appendix 2.F presents
some of the most recent papers.
An interesting result of our paper is that, except for France, the degree of
forward-looking behavior is found to be lower when using survey data instead of
imposing rational expectations. And this finding is qualitatively confirmed by the
other survey data studies. In table 2.6 we calculated averages of the estimates of γf
that are presented in tables 2.12 and 2.13 in appendix 2.F. Germany is a very striking
example. While studies using the rational expectations approach find an average
coefficient for γf of 0.67, our estimates are much lower, with an average value of
0.26. Reckwerth (1997) who uses another source for German inflation expectations
also finds estimates for γf which are smaller than under the rational expectations
approach. The results for the US point into the same direction. While the average
value for γf under rational expectations is 0.61, our regressions returned an average
value of 0.40. Again, this tendency of a lower degree of forward-looking behavior is
confirmed by other studies using survey data.
There are two possible explanations for the gap between the estimates for
γf . First, we provide evidence for a more recent period as our sample starts at
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Euro France Ger Italy UK US
zone -many
Ifo WES 0.52 0.77 0.26 0.26 0.48 0.40
other surveys 0.49 - 0.43 - - 0.43
RE approach 0.62 0.65 0.67 0.52 0.70 0.61
Notes: As some of the papers cited in table 2.13 of appendix F only report
standard errors for the deep parameters of the Phillips curve (β, θ, ω), but
not for γf , we resorted to a non-parametric statistical significance test, the
Wilcoxon rank-sum test, for testing whether our γf ’s are significantly lower
than those in the RE (= rational expectations) literature. The results, which
are available from the authors upon request, show that the null hypothesis
that the median of the RE estimates is lower than our estimates can be
rejected at the 5% level for all countries except France.
Table 2.6: Summary of estimates for γf
the beginning of the 1990s whereas most of the other studies begin in the 1960s or
1970s. Most of the countries in our sample, however, underwent one or even more
significant changes in their monetary policy strategy. As the monetary policy regime
that is in force plays a crucial role for the estimated behavioral parameters, it is likely
that these models suffer from instabilities that cannot be accounted for by GMM
techniques. Unfortunately, stability of the results is rarely discussed in these papers.
Note, however, that a shorter sample size cannot explain why γf in these studies
tends to be systematically higher than in our study. A further argument against
this explanation are the results of other studies listed in table 2.12 using US survey
data. While their samples range from the 1960s to 1999 or later, which roughly
corresponds to to the time span covered by most rational expectations studies, the
average point estimates for γf are close to ours.
Second, the above findings are consistent with some recent papers questioning
the appropriateness of the rational expectations approach. The Phillips curve model
is typically estimated by replacing expectations with actual realizations and by
deriving orthogonality conditions that may be used to estimate the parameters of
the model with GMM. These moment conditions are derived on the assumption
that expectations are rational, i.e. that the expectation-induced ‘errors in variables’
must be orthogonal to the information set available to the agents at the time the
expectations are formed. Rudd and Whelan (2005), however, argue that GMM
estimates may overstate the degree of forward-looking behavior if the instrument
set includes variables that directly cause inflation but are omitted from the hybrid
model specification. Thus, the error term of the estimation equation is no longer a
pure rational expectations error. As a consequence estimates for γf will be biased
upwards as long as both, πt+1 and its instruments, are correlated with the omitted
variable. According to Mavroeidis (2005) the mis-specification of the Phillips curve
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model can alternatively be interpreted as a failure of rationality. Irrespective of the
source for the violation of the orthogonality conditions, he shows that the model
is weakly identified, which introduces a bias in the GMM estimation in favor of a
hybrid specification with apparently dominant forward-looking behavior.
The use of survey data avoids this problem as there is no need to specify
the expectation formation process and expectations can be taken as exogenous.
Section 2.2.2 shows in detail that a Phillips curve relationship can be derived for
a wide range of expectations formation processes. The only assumption that is
made, is that the law of iterated expectations holds. Rational expectations can be
considered as a special case. According to this theoretical model, which serves as
a basis for the econometric part of the paper, agents are considered to be forward-
looking if they do not simply extrapolate past inflation rates into the future, but use
additional information when they reset prices. This does not necessarily mean that
expectations have to be rational. They can be anything else except purely backward-
looking (i.e. Etπt+1 = πt−1), which would lead to perfect multicollinearity, and
hence to problems in the OLS estimation. In section 2.3.1 we showed that inflation
expectations from the CESifo WES are far from being rational. In addition, we
ran some simple regressions of expected inflation on past inflation, which indicate
that survey expectations contain information way beyond past inflation rates.12 In
section 2.4 the behavior of forward-looking agents is then approximated by the
survey expectations of the CESifo WES. Under the assumption that these are an
accurate measure of ‘true’ expectations, we estimated the share of forward-looking
agents using the subjective expectations HNKPC and showed that there is a role for
forward-looking behavior. Given the theoretical set-up this result holds irrespective
of the information content of the survey expectations.
The advantage of the survey data approach is that its results are more reliable
than those obtained from the GMM approach. On the one hand, there is no need
for instruments. Appendix 2.D shows at length that the estimations of the HNKPC
do not suffer from a violation of the OLS assumptions. Ruling out weak instruments
we re–estimate the Phillips Curve by TSLS and find that, in particular, endogeneity
of the regressors can be rejected. On the other hand, the OLS estimation has the
advantage that the results are robust despite the relatively short sample size. A
CUSUM of squares test, which is presented in appendix 2.E, yields satisfactory
results for the stability of the estimated parameters. It is well known that the small
sample properties of GMM estimations are very poor, meaning that estimators are
often found to be biased, widely dispersed and sensitive to the normalization of
the orthogonality conditions as well as to the choice of the instruments (see for
12Specifically, we find that πt−1 only explains between 16% (for Germany) and 56% (for France)
of the variation of expectations F̄tπt+2. These results are not shown in the paper, but available
from the authors upon request
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example Fuhrer, Moore, and Schuh, 1995, on this issue). This is also the reason
why we did not apply the rational expectations GMM approach to a shorter sample
(starting for example in 1993) in order to find out whether the identified gap between
the estimates for γf are due to the sample size or due to the proxy for inflation
expectations and the related estimation methodology.
2.6 Conclusions
In this paper we provided evidence for the fit of the hybrid New Keynesian Phillips
curve for selected Euro zone countries, the US and the UK. On a theoretical level,
we derived the Phillips curve under the assumption that a fraction of firms has
subjective expectations that may be non-rational, while the remaining fraction uses
a simple rule-of-thumb. On an empirical level, we estimated the Phillips curve by
using direct measures of inflation expectations from the CESifo World Economic
Survey, instead of imposing rational expectations and estimating the Phillips curve
by GMM.
Our main findings are as follows: First, the use of survey data gives empirical
results, which are more reliable than those obtained from the rational expectations
GMM approach. With survey data there is no need for instruments and this pro-
vides consistently and efficiently estimated parameters even when there is only a
limited sample available to the researcher. We show that OLS parameters are sta-
ble over time and endogeneity of regressors can be rejected. Second, the purely
forward-looking Phillips curve can be rejected in favor of the hybrid New Keynesian
Phillips curve as the estimated coefficients on past inflation are significantly different
from zero. Third, the estimated coefficients on past inflation are higher when us-
ing survey expectations than when using the rational expectations GMM approach.
This result is consistent with some recent papers, which argue that GMM estimates
for the degree of forward-looking behavior are biased upwards if the Phillips curve
model is mis-specified. Fourth, it remains unclear whether real unit labor costs or
a measure of the output gap should be used as a proxy for real marginal costs. For
some countries (the Euro zone, France, Germany) the first is better, while for other
countries (Italy, the UK, the US) the latter is superior. This shows that both are
only an imperfect proxy for real marginal costs. Fifth, theory-based restrictions lead
to an improvement of the empirical results.
One explanation for our findings is that non-rationalities which are incorpo-
rated in survey expectations may matter for the price-setting process of firms. If
we are correct in using a survey among economic experts for approximating firms’
expectations, such an explanation would have an important impact on the policy
conclusions that are typically drawn on the basis of general equilibrium models where
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agents are assumed to form expectations rationally. Some first attempts to model
deviations from perfectly rational expectations have been developed by Mankiw and
Reis (2002). In their sticky-information model they impose a constraint on the in-
formation that people use when forming expectations. They assume that in each
period there is a fixed probability that a person updates his information set; other-
wise he continues to set prices on outdated information. In Ball, Mankiw, and Reis
(2005) they provide a normative monetary policy analysis that accounts for these
deviations from rationality. And their central conclusion is that under such a setting
the central bank should target the price level rather than the inflation rate. Thus,
in future work it would be interesting to investigate in more detail how the private
sector actually forms inflation expectations.
Appendix
2.A Derivation of Equation (2.9)
Equation (2.9) can be derived by subtracting equation (2.7) from equation (2.6)
F it [p
f
t+1]− pft = F it [πft+1] =
1
I
F it [
I∑
h=1
(pf,ht+1 − pf,ht )]
and by replacing pf,ht+1 and p
f,h
t with the first expression of equation (2.5):
F it [π
f
t+1] =
1− βθ
I
F it [
I∑
h=1
{F ht+1[
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k(mct+k+1 + pt+k+1)]−
−F ht [
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k(mct+k + pt+k)]}].
Applying the law of iterated expectations (equation (2.8)) this expression can be
simplified to
F it [π
f
t+1] =
1− βθ
I
F it [
I∑
h=1
{(1− βθ)F ht [
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k(mct+k+1 + pt+k+1)]− (mct + pt)}].
Replacing (1− βθ)F ht [
∑∞
k=0(βθ)
k(mct+k+1 + pt+k+1)] with p
f,h
t+1 (equation (2.5)) and
using equation (2.6) finally gives equation (2.9):
F it [π
f
t+1] = (1− βθ)(F it [pft+1]−mct − pt).
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2.B Derivation of Equation (2.10)
Equation (2.10) can be derived by aggregating equation (2.3) to
p∗t = (1− ω)pft + ωpbt ,
solving the resulting expression for pft and replacing p
b
t with equation (2.4):
pft =
p∗t − ω(p∗t−1 + pt−1 − pt−2)
1− ω .
Next, solve equation (2.2) for p∗t and replace it in the preceding expression. After a
little algebra, equation (2.10) is obtained:
pft =
pt + (θω − 2ω − θ)pt−1 + ωpt−2
(1− θ)(1− ω) .
2.C Derivation of Equation (2.12)
Inserting equation (2.11) on the right-hand-side of equation (2.9) gives
F it [π
f
t+1] = (1− βθ)
(
F it [πt+1]− ωπt
(1− θ)(1− β) −mct
)
.
Forming average subjective expectations, F̄t[·] = (1/I)
∑I
i=1 F
i
t [·], yields
F̄t[π
f
t+1] = (1− βθ)
(
F̄t[πt+1]− ωπt
(1− θ)(1− β) −mct
)
.
An alternative expression for F it [π
f
t+1] can de derived by subtracting equation (2.10)
from equation (2.11):
F it [π
f
t+1] =
F it [πt+1] + (θω − 2ω − θ)πt + ωπt−1
(1− θ)(1− ω) .
Forming average subjective expectations yields
F̄t[π
f
t+1] =
F̄t[πt+1] + (θω − 2ω − θ)πt + ωπt−1
(1− θ)(1− ω) .
Equating both expressions for F̄t[π
f
t+1] and solving for πt finally results in equation
(2.12):
πt = γf F̄t[πt+1] + γbπt−1 + λmct,
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where
γf =
βθ
θ + ω[1− θ(1− β)] ,
γb =
ω
θ + ω[1− θ(1− β)] ,
λ =
(1− ω)(1− θ)(1− βθ)
θ + ω[1− θ(1− β)] .
2.D Endogeneity of the Regressors
This appendix investigates whether the estimates presented in tables 2.3 to 2.5 suffer
from endogeneity of the regressors. On the one hand, the expectational variable
F̄tπt+2 may be caused by the current inflation rate – a problem which is often
referred to as simultaneity. On the other hand, the OLS estimations of the HNKPC
may suffer from correlation between the lagged endogenous variable πt−1 and the
error term of the regression.
The endogeneity problem of the OLS regressions is addressed by re-estimating
the two Phillips curve models using instrumental variables methods. Specifically,
we run a two-stage least squares (TSLS) regression where we instrument for F̄tπt+2
and – in the case of the HNKPC – for πt−1. As instruments for F̄tπt+2 we consider
a constant and up to six lags of inflation expectations, real unit labor costs and
the output gap, which are the driving variables of the inflation process. Six lags
should be sufficient to account for the dynamics in the economy. In the case of
the HNKPC we are likely to face a difficulty due to the fact that both endogenous
regressors (expected and lagged inflation) often follow a very similar pattern. By
simply using a constant and lagged values of inflation expectations, real unit labor
costs and the output gap, the instruments may be weak in the sense of Stock and
Yogo (2005) and thus lead to a bias in the TSLS estimates. Thus, we need to choose
a set of instrumental variables that allows us to identify the effect of both, inflation
expectations and lagged inflation, on current inflation.
In order to test whether the instrumental variables estimations suffer from weak
instruments, we calculate the Cragg-Donald statistic for all possible combinations
of instruments (i.e. 219 combinations).13 In the case of Italy we additionally have
to include lags of the spread between the short-term and the long-term interest rate
as a possible instrumental variable to rule out weak instruments. For each number
of instruments we then record the combination of instruments that results in the
maximum value of the Cragg-Donald statistic. Finally, we choose the instrument
13The test statistic was proposed by Cragg and Donald (1993) and Stock, Wright, and Yogo
(2002). It can be seen as the matrix analog of the first-stage F-statistic in a multivariate setting.
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set, which contains the largest number of instruments and, at the same time, gives
rise to a bias of the IV regression compared to OLS which is significantly less than
10% according to table 1 in Stock and Yogo (2005). This algorithm chooses the
instrument sets described in table 2.7. Table 2.8 presents the related Cragg-Donald
statistics, which shows that in all cases the null hypothesis of weak instruments can
be rejected at the 5% significance level.
c F̄t−kπt−k+2 GAPt−k RULCt−k
k 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
RULC
Euro zone ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
France ∗ ∗
Germany ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Italy♦ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
UK ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
US ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
GAP
Euro zone ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
France ∗ ∗
Germany ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Italy♦ ∗ ∗ ∗
UK ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
US ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Notes: A “∗” indicates that the respective lag (or constant) was included in the instru-
ment set.
♦: For the estimation of the HNKPC of Italy lags 1 and 4 of the interest rate spread
enter the estimation as instruments in addition to the ones marked with a “∗”.
Table 2.7: Instrument sets for the HNKPC
In a next step we present the results of the TSLS regressions in tables 2.9 to
2.11. Provided that the instruments are valid, it is possible to test whether one of
the regressors is endogenous. Hausman (1978) proposed a test, which compares the
estimates of the OLS regression with those of the TSLS regression. If they are not
systematically different, one should rely on the results of the OLS regression and
conclude that there is no problem of endogenous regressors.14 In tables 2.9 to 2.11
the columns, which are labeled with H show the p-values for the null hypothesis
that the OLS estimates are consistent and efficient.
14 Note that the distribution of the test statistic is only known for variance-covariance matrices
of estimators that have not been adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Therefore,
we use the unadjusted variance-covariance matrices to calculate the test statistic. However, the
p-values for the significance of the estimated parameters were calculated using Newey-West ad-
justment of the standard errors.
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Euro France Ger Italy UK US
zone -many
RULC
forward-looking 145.0‡
[19]
68.02‡
[19]
32.90‡
[19]
32.90‡
[19]
67.01‡
[19]
77.07‡
[19]
hybrid 10.03†
[7]
8.82†
[2]
10.68†
[8]
9.13†
[6]
10.32†
[5]
7.82†
[4]
GAP
forward-looking 107.7‡
[19]
34.16‡
[19]
19.91†
[19]
23.30‡
[19]
53.39‡
[19]
50.37‡
[19]
hybrid 10.63†
[7]
8.35†
[2]
10.89†
[9]
9.08†
[5]
9.25†
[4]
8.40†
[4]
Notes: The number of instruments used in each regression is given in brackets. Critical
values for the 5% significance level are provided by Stock and Yogo (2005), table 1, with
‡ (†) denoting a desired maximal bias of the IV estimator relative to OLS of 5% (10%).
Sample period: 1993:1 - 2004:2.
Table 2.8: Weak instrument test (Cragg-Donald statistic)
RULC GAP
β λ H β λ′ H
Euro zone 1.03
[0.00]
0.16
[0.01]
0.09 1.03
[0.00]
−0.07
[0.25]
0.12
France 0.98
[0.00]
0.08
[0.03]
0.70 1.00
[0.00]
0.03
[0.17]
0.67
Germany 1.10
[0.00]
0.35
[0.01]
0.11 1.10
[0.00]
−0.05
[0.77]
0.14
Italy 0.94
[0.00]
0.03
[0.52]
0.01 0.92
[0.00]
−0.03
[0.72]
0.01
UK 0.86
[0.00]
0.00
[0.93]
0.11 0.88
[0.00]
0.12
[0.01]
0.06
US 0.85
[0.00]
0.07
[0.13]
0.07 0.83
[0.00]
−0.05
[0.16]
0.13
Notes: See table 2.3. The column labeled with H shows the p-values
for the null hypothesis that the OLS estimates are consistent and
efficient.
Table 2.9: IV (TSLS) estimation results for the forward-looking Phillips curve
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The following results can be summarized. A comparison of table 2.9 with table
2.3 shows that the estimated coefficients only change slightly. While, as a general
rule, the estimates become somewhat higher, the significance of the coefficients
remains unaffected. Nevertheless, the null hypothesis of the Hausman test is rejected
at the 5% level for Italy (irrespective of the proxy for real marginal costs) and at the
10% level for the RULC model of the Euro zone and the US and the GAP model
of the UK. This may be due to the fact that we apply the test to OLS and TSLS
estimates whose variance-covariance matrix is not adjusted for heteroscedasticity
and autocorrelation. As the latter is only a problem when estimating the purely
forward-looking Phillips curve, the results of the Hausman test have to be interpreted
with caution.
RULC GAP
γf γb λ H γf γb λ
′
H
Euro Zone 0.55
[0.00]
0.47
[0.00]
0.07
[0.04]
0.62 0.48
[0.00]
0.55
[0.00]
0.00
[0.91]
0.63
France 0.62
[0.00]
0.36
[0.00]
0.05
[0.08]
0.54 0.71
[0.00]
0.30
[0.00]
0.04
[0.02]
0.93
Germany 0.28
[0.00]
0.76
[0.00]
0.08
[0.28]
0.58 0.26
[0.00]
0.81
[0.00]
0.05
[0.24]
0.19
Italy 0.29
[0.00]
0.69
[0.00]
−0.01
[0.65]
0.35 0.29
[0.00]
0.72
[0.00]
0.06
[0.02]
0.20
UK 0.47
[0.00]
0.45
[0.00]
−0.01
[0.74]
0.55 0.54
[0.00]
0.39
[0.00]
0.10
[0.00]
0.89
US 0.50
[0.00]
0.41
[0.00]
0.04
[0.06]
0.48 0.41
[0.00]
0.51
[0.00]
0.01
[0.87]
0.29
Notes: See table 2.3. The column labeled with H shows the p-values for the null hy-
pothesis that the OLS estimates are consistent and efficient.
Table 2.10: IV (TSLS) estimation results for the hybrid Phillips curve
In the case of the HNKPC (tables 2.10 and 2.11) the results of the Hausman
test indicate unambiguously that the OLS estimates are reliable. A comparison of
table 2.10 with table 2.4 shows that the TSLS estimates are very close to those
obtained from the OLS regression. As before the significance of the coefficients
remains unaffected. A similar conclusion can be drawn for the restricted HNKPC
(tables 2.11 and 2.5). As a general rule, the estimated coefficients (and hence the
degree of forward-looking behavior) are somewhat lower than in the OLS regression.
To sum up, the TSLS estimates and the results of the Hausman test indicate that
the OLS procedure is superior to TSLS and yields reliable estimates for the Phillips
curve.
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RULC GAP
γf λ H γf λ
′
H
Euro zone 0.51
[0.00]
0.07
[0.00]
0.94 0.45
[0.00]
−0.02
[0.42]
0.73
France 0.60
[0.00]
0.04
[0.11]
0.45 0.60
[0.00]
0.03
[0.04]
0.34
Germany 0.23
[0.00]
0.08
[0.26]
0.69 0.18
[0.00]
0.01
[0.81]
0.45
Italy 0.19
[0.09]
−0.01
[0.55]
0.68 0.30
[0.00]
0.06
[0.00]
0.70
UK 0.37
[0.00]
0.01
[0.59]
0.31 0.45
[0.00]
0.13
[0.00]
0.81
US 0.29
[0.00]
0.04
[0.30]
0.42 0.27
[0.00]
0.07
[0.05]
0.11
Notes: See table 2.3. The column labeled with H shows the p-values for
the null hypothesis that the OLS estimates are consistent and efficient.
Table 2.11: IV (TSLS) estimation results for the hybrid Phillips curve when γf +γb =
1
2.E Stability of the Estimates
This appendix investigates whether the estimated coefficients of the Phillips curve
are stable over time. Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show the results of a CUSUM of squares
test at the 1% level. For both, the purely forward-looking Phillips curves and the
HNKPC, the cumulated sum of squares of recursive residuals lie within the signifi-
cance lines for Germany, Italy, the UK and the US, implying that the regression re-
lationship is constant over time, irrespective of the chosen measure for real marginal
cost. For the other countries, the cumulated sum of squares of recursive residuals
temporarily crosses the significance lines, but then stays inside the thresholds again.
Note however that due to the high degree of auto-correlation in the residuals of
the purely forward-looking Phillips curves, the CUSUM of squares test has to be
interpreted with caution as the distribution of the test statistic is not known.
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Figure 2.4: CUSUM of squares of the forward-looking Phillips curve: RULC (upper
panel) and GAP (lower panel).
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Figure 2.5: CUSUM of squares of HNKPC: RULC (upper panel) and GAP (lower
panel).
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2.F Discussion of the Results: Tables
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Chapter 3
Learning Trend Inflation – Can
Signal Extraction Explain Survey
Forecasts?
Abstract
It can be shown that inflation expectations and associated forecast er-
rors are characterized by a high degree of persistence. One reason may
be that forecasters cannot directly observe the inflation target pursued
by the central bank and, hence, face a complicated forecasting prob-
lem. In particular, they have to infer whether the observed movement of
the inflation rate is due to a permanent change of policy parameters or
whether it is the result of a transient shock. Consequently, it is assumed
that agents behave like econometricians who filter noisy information by
estimating an unobserved components model. This constitutes the trend
learning algorithm employed by the forecaster. To examine whether this
is a valid assumption, I fit a simple learning model to US survey ex-
pectations. The second part contains an out–of–sample forecasting ex-
periment which shows that learning by signal extraction matches survey
measures closer than other standard models. Moreover, it turns out that
a weighted average of different expectation formation processes with a
prominent role for signal extraction behavior is well suited to explain
survey measures of inflation expectations.
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3.1 Introduction
Perfect foresight and full information about constant policy parameters are com-
mon assumptions in many macroeconomic models. However, one implication of the
standard New Keynesian model with rational expectations is that an unanticipated
change in the inflation target would lead to a sudden jump in the level of inflation
expectations. Consequently, if the model is purely forward–looking, disinflation is
not accompanied by an output loss. However, both implications, the jump behav-
ior of expectations and the absence of disinflation cost can certainly be doubted.
Focussing on inflation expectations here, these can be shown to exhibit a series of
features that are inconsistent with the assumption of rational expectation formation
in the sense of Muth (1961). For instance, Evans and Wachtel (1992) find that U.S.
inflation expectations are biased and inefficient predictors of future inflation.1 In
particular, forecast errors are found to be persistent and can be explained ex–post.
In their paper, Evans and Wachtel (1992) emphasize the empirical relevance of
information constraints for the formation of inflation expectations. They state that
the forecasts generated by their univariate regime–switching model exhibit some
important properties of survey data on inflation expectations. A more recent series
of papers also relaxes the assumption of perfect knowledge. Among others, Kozicki
and Tinsley (2005), Andolfatto and Gomme (2003), Nunes (2004) and Erceg and
Levin (2003) emphasize the importance of the persistence of expectations for the
inflation process. One of their findings is that learning behavior is important to
explain the transition dynamics of monetary policy which has implications for the
design of monetary policy.2 They also stress that this has resulted in quantitatively
important welfare effects on output and interest rates during disinflation episodes.
In these papers, inflation persistence stems from the fact that rational agents face
a complicated forecasting problem when forming expectations. Theoretically, one
reason is that they only observe noisy information, which constitutes a signal ex-
traction problem. Like in Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), the problem arises from
the fact that it cannot be distinguished between permanent target shocks and tran-
sitory shocks to the policy rate. Consequently, if the conduct of monetary policy
changes over time, thereby changing the inflation target, agents face a complicated
forecasting problem: the decomposition of inflation into trends and transitory com-
ponents. The investigation of trend breaks in measures of inflation expectations has
rarely been a subject of studies. However, the behavior of expectations following a
trend shift is of importance. As noted above, sluggish expectations will constitute
1Among others see Roberts (1997) and Branch (2004) and the papers cited there.
2For instance, Andolfatto and Gomme (2003) advocate the idea that it is important for a
central bank to be credible, as this significantly reduces the output inflation trade–off. For other
implications of learning for an optimal monetary policy see Evans and Honkapohja (2003). Also
see Cogley and Sbordone (2006) on implications for the New Keynesian Phillips curve.
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the persistence of inflation rates. From the point of view of the monetary authority,
it is important to know what implications a trend shift has on inflation expectations
because it will determine how costly a disinflation policy will be in terms of output
loss, as emphasized by Nunes (2004). Andolfatto and Gomme (2003), for example
give a theoretical justification why transparency will reduce the cost of disinflation.
Another theoretical explanation for the rejection of rational expectations is
that agents are boundedly rational, which means that they face resource constraints
if information is costly (rational inattention) or that they lack sophistication. Within
these frameworks, rational agents would, again, solve the forecasting problem by
application of some (optimal) learning algorithm. These arguments have been put
forward by Branch (2004) or Pajfar and Santoro (2007), among others. Moreover,
Branch and Evans (2006) emphasize the importance of simple forecasting models on
the part of private agents to model expectations in a setting of bounded rationality.
The main finding of these papers is that aggregate expectations are the result of
forecasting exercises undertaken by heterogenous agents, which are characterized
by different effort and different forecasting models. In particular, these differences
occur with respect to the learning rules.
Here, I basically follow the above frameworks and assume that agents have
to make decisions in an environment that is characterized by noisy information.
This, in turn, leads to a forecasting problem for decision makers which is more
complicated than in perfect foresight models: How can the action of a central bank
be interpreted in the light of new information? Does a shift of the inflation rate stem
from a temporary policy action or some other temporary shock or does it reflect a
permanent change in the policy parameters – i.e. the inflation target? Certainly,
agents have to form expectations about these issues which will ultimately be reflected
in their projections of the inflation rate. A lack of information in this context
arises for different reasons. Either the monetary authority refrains from complete
disclosure of the policy making process (intransparency) or the announced inflation
target may not be fully credible. Moreover, to account for bounded rationality, I will
assume a simple forecasting model on part of private agents. Following the approach
of Branch and Evans (2006) and Dossche and Everaert (2005), I will restrict the
analysis to univariate forecasting models. The advantage is that no assumptions
about the structural relationships between variables have to be made and results
will not depend on a specific theoretical model.
In the literature on learning, it has become standard to assume that agents
act like econometricians who estimate the unknown parameters of the forecasting
model from past data. As outlined above, here, they are also confronted with a signal
extraction problem they solve by estimating permanent and transitory components
of inflation in order to come up with a forecast. In particular, the forecasters will
update trend perceptions each time a new observation becomes available. To do so
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in an efficient way, they build up an unobserved components model and make use
of the Kalman filter recursions.
In chapter 3.2 I will have a closer look at the different survey measures for
inflation expectations. Thereby I will briefly update and review some of the in-
herent characteristics of inflation expectations. Chapter 3.3 investigates whether a
model of signal extraction can be fit to several survey measures for U.S. inflation
expectations, thereby answering the question: Do agents update trend expectations
in the light of past forecast errors? At this point, it will also be of interest to know
how long it takes until agents learn about a new monetary policy regime. Taking
an out–of–sample perspective in chapter 3.4, I will analyze in a forecasting experi-
ment which forecasting model is able to approximate the respective survey closest.
As suggested by the theory on heterogeneous expectations, aggregate measures of
inflation expectations should be seen as a weighted average of different forecasting
schemes. Hence, chapter 3.5 will be devoted to the questions which part of the sur-
vey participants learn by signal extraction and does the composition of aggregate
expectations change when different periods are considered?
3.2 A First Look at Inflation Expectations
In the following section, some of the inherent features of inflation expectations and
related forecast errors are explored for a selection of US surveys: the Survey of Pro-
fessional Forecasters (SPF), the Livingston Survey (LIV) and the Michigan House-
hold Survey (MHS). I will further investigate if the common notion of rational
expectations in the way it has been introduced by Muth (1961) applies to survey
measures of inflation expectations of experts and households.
3.2.1 Data Description
On the whole, I will focus on five different questions asked in the surveys mentioned
above. The survey results, which will be labeled SPF h=1 in the following contain
the expected quarterly change of the GDP deflator one quarter ahead. Here, data is
available from 1968 fourth quarter and ends in 2007 second quarter. SPF h=4 gives
information on the expected average change of the quarterly GDP deflator during
the next four quarters. The dataset starts in 1970 second quarter and ends in 2007
second quarter. Note, that these forecasts are overlapping as the survey is conducted
on a quarterly frequency. LIV h=1 contains expectations of the annualized six
month consumer price inflation six months ahead. This constitutes no overlapping
forecasts as LIV is conducted biannually. In contrast to LIV h=2, which gives
expectations of 12 month CPI inflation one year ahead and where the overlap is one
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period. I use expectations from the post war period beginning in January 1953 up
to June 2007. The last survey measure of inflation expectations is given by MHS
h=12 where households are asked the following question:
A: During the next 12 months, do you think that prices in general will
go up, or go down, or stay where they are now?
B: By about what percent do you expect prices to go (up/down) on the
average, during the next 12 months?
This entails an overlap of 11 periods. MHS runs from January 1978 up to June 2007.
As a consequence of the variety of questions under consideration, the reference series
are quite different for the respective survey not only as far as the measure of price
increase – and the associated variability of the series – is concerned but also with
respect to the forecasting horizon.
3.2.2 (Un)biasedness and (In)efficiency of Forecasts?
Define the survey expectation error as the difference between realized inflation and
survey expectation with a forecast horizon of h periods. (Error = πt−πet|t−h). Thus,
negative values result when the inflation rate is overestimated. Figure 3.1 visualizes
the data by showing inflation expectations of SPF, LIV (beginning in 1950) and
MHS respectively. All surveys cover the period of high inflation beginning in the
seventies, reaching a peak around 1980 and falling again in the subsequent period of
disinflation under the Volcker regime. They also contain the rather tranquil period of
the presidency of Greenspan starting in November 1987 and the recent period under
the presidency of Bernanke since 2006. It becomes clear that cumulated forecast
errors tend to follow the pattern of the inflation rate itself. This means that during
phases of rising inflation like in the 1970s a repeated underprediction of inflation
rates can be observed. As inflation comes down to moderate levels in due course,
the cumulated forecast error decreases again most notably for SPF and LIV, which
means that inflation is overpredicted during that period. Also note that in almost
all cases considered here, the cumulated forecast error displays strong persistence.
This means that an error in one period is not completely offset in the subsequent
period but agents are sluggish when changing expectations. Thus, there seems to
be a case for bounded rationality.
The recent findings can also be investigated more formally. In the following,
I basically update some of the results on survey expectations found in Evans and
Wachtel (1992) whose sample ends in 1991. Following the rational expectations
hypothesis of Muth (1961), forecast errors as defined above should follow a zero
mean white noise process if survey participants form rational expectations. This
74 CHAPTER3: LEARNING TREND INFLATION
requires expectations to be unbiased and efficient in the sense that no information is
omitted when forming expectations. To check if unbiasedness is a valid assumption,
I run the regression described in equation (3.1) and test if a = 0 and b = 1 by means
of a Wald test.
(3.1) πt = a + bπ
e
t|t−h + εt
Here, πet|t−h is the expected inflation rate conditional on the information set
at time t − h. Figure 3.2 plots recursive Wald tests, as well as a test based on a
rolling window of five years for SPF and MHS and ten years for LIV. Considering
the whole sample, unbiasedness is not rejected for both questions asked in SPF.
If sub–samples are considered by recursive estimation, the SPF provides biased
expectations up to the mid–eighties when there has been the large swing in the
inflation rate. Afterwards – with the period of disinflation having passed – the test
indicates that expectations are unbiased. Rolling window estimates point into the
same direction. The finding can also be confirmed by looking at the cumulated
forecast error which returns to zero in the mid–nineties, thereby indicating that –
on average – expectations have been unbiased.
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Note: The first panel shows the expected annualized quarterly GDP inflation one quarter ahead along with the
realizations. The sample begins in 1968 Q4 and ends in 2007 Q2. The second panel depicts the four quarter moving
average of GDP inflation along with expected average annualized inflation from SPF during the next h = 4 quarters
where the sample runs from 1970 Q2 to 2007 Q2. The third panel depicts the annualized six months growth rate
of CPI along with expected inflation with a forecasting horizon of h = 1 half years. The fourth panel contains the
one year growth rate of prices along with expected inflation with a forecasting horizon of h = 2. Both measures
are taken from LIV where the sample runs from 1950 I to 2007 I. The last panel shows CPI Inflation as the twelve
months moving average growth rate of prices along with expected CPI inflation with a forecasting horizon of h = 12
months from MHS. The sample runs from 1978 M1 to 2007 M6. The lower part of each panel shows a plot of the
cumulated forecast errors
∑t
τ=0(πτ − πeτ |τ−h) up to time t.
Figure 3.1: Inflation expectations from MHS, SPF, LIV
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Note: The solid red line shows p–values for a recursive Wald–test of H0 : a = 0, b = 1. The dashed line represents
p–values based on a rolling window. The initial estimation period and the rolling window cover 5 years for SPF, 10
years for LIV and 5 years for MHS. The sample runs from 1968 Q4 - 2007 Q2 (SPF h=1), 1970 Q2 - 2007 Q2 (SPF
h=4), 1950 I - 2007 I (LIV h=1 and LIV h=2) and 1978 M1 - 2007 M6 (MHS).
Figure 3.2: Recursive Wald–test SPF, LIV, MHS
On the other hand, LIV, which is questioned on a semiannual frequency, is
clearly biased. But when estimated on a rolling window beginning in the late sev-
enties, which does not cover much of the period of high inflation, it turns out to
be unbiased. The MHS is biased throughout the whole sample, whereas the rolling
window tests indicate unbiasedness from time to time – especially during the mid–
eighties again. Keeping in mind that it is an household survey and that the sample
does not cover all of the high inflation period either, this does not come a surprise.
When compared to the representation of the cumulated forecast error, biasedness is
confirmed by the fact that the zero line is not crossed although the cumulated errors
clearly stabilize in the second half of the sample. Thus, whether an expectations
series is biased crucially hinges on the time period considered. One conclusion which
can be drawn here is that biasedness of expectations seems to be a small–sample
problem in the sense that samples are finite.
3.2. A FIRST LOOK AT INFLATION EXPECTATIONS 77
Another way to test if survey participants tend to adjust their beliefs in the
light of new information in a sluggish manner, is to directly look at autocorrelation.
If forecast errors are highly persistent, then – after the concept of rational expecta-
tions of Muth (1961) – one concludes that forecasts are formed inefficiently. Note,
however, that for overlapping forecasts, a shock that occurs within the forecasting
period cannot be taken into account by the forecaster and the same mistake is neces-
sarily repeated. Therefore, I present a test proposed by Cumby and Huizinga (1992)
which allows to deal with the fact that forecasts are h − 1 dependent. Figure 3.3
shows recursive p–values for a test of first–order autocorrelation of forecast errors
based on the `–statistic of Cumby and Huizinga (1992), as well as p–values based
on a rolling window of five years for SPF and MHS and ten years for LIV.
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Note: The solid lines represent recursive p–values for a test of autocorrelation of forecast errors based on the `–
statistic proposed by Cumby and Huizinga (1992). The dashed lines give p–values for the `–statistic for a rolling
window. The initial estimation period and the rolling window covers 5 years for MHS and SPF and 10 years for
LIV. The sample runs from 1968 Q4 - 2007 Q2 (SPF h=1), 1970 Q2 - 2007 Q2 (SPF h=4), 1950 I - 2007 I (LIV
h=1 and h=2) and 1978 M1 - 2007 M6 (MHS).
Figure 3.3: Persistence of forecast errors of SPF, LIV, MHS
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For the whole sample, indeed, the `–statistic is significant for SPF and LIV.
However, there seems to be a period in the beginning of each sample where no
persistence of forecast errors can be found. Looking at SPF and LIV it becomes
clear that autocorrelation is found from the late seventies or the early eighties on.
Furthermore, considering the rolling window estimates for LIV in the eighties –
a period of large swings of inflation – the test indicates that forecast errors are
persistent during that period of time. As far as MHS is considered, errors exhibit
significant persistence during the eighties. Based on a recursive scheme, this is not
confirmed for the whole sample. But keep in mind that the sample starts only in
1978 and does not contain the whole period of high inflation. If persistence of errors
is a major problem during periods of large swings, then – in terms of sample size –
estimates based on the whole sample are probably dominated by the longer period
of only moderate movements in case of MHS. In order to investigate this in more
depth, I also analyze if forecast errors are larger and tend to exhibit more persistence
when the underlying variable experiences large changes. The correlation between
forecast errors and inflation is presented in the left part of table 3.1, whereas the
right part gives the correlation with forecast changes.
Cross correlation of forecast error
∆πt ∆πet|t−h
πt − πet|t−h lag0 lag1 lag2 lag4 lag0 lag1 lag2 lag4
SPF h=1 0.54 0.27 0.03 0.15 0.43 0.17 0.10 0.20
SPF h=4 0.73 0.72 0.66 0.44 0.76 0.78 0.74 0.51
LIV h=1 0.64 0.27 0.19 −0.04 0.55 0.20 0.14 −0.05
LIV h=2 0.77 0.59 0.33 −0.03 0.70 0.60 0.33 0.03
MHS h=12 0.76 0.73 0.66 0.56 0.61 0.55 0.53 0.51
Note: The sample of survey forecast errors runs from 1969Q1−2007Q2 (SPF
h=1), 1971Q2 − 2007Q2 (SPF h=4) and 1950 II − 2007 I (LIV h=1) and
1951 I − 2007 I (LIV h=2) and 1979M1 − 2007M6 (MHS). The displayed
lag lengths coincide with very different time intervals. Due to the different
frequencies of the surveys, four lags imply for the MHS 4 months, for the SPF
one year and for the LIV two years.
Table 3.1: Cross correlation of forecast errors
Errors are apparently positively correlated with the change of the inflation rate.
This is compatible with the view that an overestimation of inflation comes along
whenever the inflation rate declines or has declined the period before. In other words,
the higher the decline, the larger is the associated overestimation which implies that
forecasters do not respond very rapidly to shocks in the inflation rate. This is in
line with the findings from figure 3.3. Interestingly, the same result can also be
found for the correlation of forecast errors with forecast changes. Whenever an
underprediction occurs, there is a tendency to raise forecasts in subsequent periods.
In general, this shows that forecasts do not respond very quickly to past errors.
To conclude, expectations are formed in a way inconsistent with the com-
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mon concept of rationality which relies on full information and perfect foresight.
Consequently, a number of studies have also come to the conclusion that rational
expectations do not provide a good description of expectation formation processes3.
It is important to note that expectational errors are found to be persistent especially
in periods of large inflation movements. Moreover, for SPF, a bias is only found for
such a period but not for the whole sample, whereas the other surveys are unbiased
in a sub–sample around the mid–eighties. From table 3.1 it can also be inferred that
forecast errors are larger during periods which are characterized by large swings of
inflation and where forecasting is more complicated. Note, that all surveys seem to
behave very similar with respect to bias and persistence of expectational errors de-
spite the fact that respondents and reference variables as well as forecasting horizons
differ considerably. In the following, I will investigate whether these characteristics
are related to signal–extraction in a noisy environment.
3.3 Learning With a Simple Forecasting Model
3.3.1 Motivation and General Framework
Standard New Keynesian models, which assume rational expectations, will predict
that unanticipated changes in the inflation target of a central bank will lead to an
immediate jump of expectations and the level of inflation. As shown in section
3.2.2 this is not a realistic assumption because expectations are characterized by
significant inherent persistence. Moreover, section 3.2.2 suggests that, although
inflation may move rather quickly in disinflation episodes, expectations adjust only
sluggishly. In Andolfatto and Gomme (2003), for instance, the authors argue that
these features are observed not because agents are ignorant. They simply face a
complicated forecasting problem which introduces sluggish adjustment to a new
target inflation. Thus, disinflation comes along with significant output loss. The
key assumption of the analysis in the present paper is that private decision makers
cannot directly observe the inflation target pursued by the central bank. This may be
due to the fact that the central bank is not transparent or that it has low credibility.
Moreover, there may be information problems as far as the timing of the change is
concerned. Note, that this situation is well applicable for the case of U.S. inflation
during the eighties. Moreover, it may be valid even today as the FED does not
announce an explicit target rate.
Following Andolfatto, Hendry, and Moran (2002), Dossche and Everaert (2005),
Kozicki and Tinsley (2005) and Erceg and Levin (2003), I assume that agents solve a
signal extraction problem in order to infer whether the observed movement of infla-
3See for example Roberts (1997) and the papers cited there.
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tion is due to a transient monetary policy shock or whether the monetary authority
has changed its inflation target, which will result in a permanent change of the level
of inflation. In particular, they have to form expectations about trend inflation,
which, in these models, coincides with the central bank’s inflation target.
More intuitively, the signal extraction problem can be described as follows. In
the first place, private decision makers observe an interest rate that is higher than
would be the outcome of a strict application of the interest rule. They perceive the
action of the central bank as if there had been a discretionary transitory shock to the
system. However, it will be offset by application of the monetary policy rule in due
course when the monetary authority wants to achieve its target again. Consequently,
after having observed a monetary tightening, agents expect that, in the next quarter,
inflation will rise to target levels again. If, however, inflation remains at lower than
target levels for more a longer period of time, then decision makers will conclude
that the target has changed. But they are not informed about the magnitude of
the change. This constitutes the signal extraction problem as they cannot observe
to which extent the movement of the inflation rate is due to a temporary monetary
action and which part of the change in inflation rates is the result of a permanent
shift. Thus, they have to form expectations about the target that is pursued by
the central bank. Even if they do so in an optimal way, it will take some time
until they can infer the correct new target from the observed action. Consequently,
expectational errors will occur although decision makers are not ignorant. A fact
that has been emphasized by Andolfatto, Hendry, and Moran (2006) and Evans and
Wachtel (1992).
One obvious solution to the signal extraction problem is given by application
of the Kalman filter. Due to its recursive formulation, it provides the theoretical
concept describing how private agents learn about trend inflation in this study.
Moreover, this learning rule is optimal, provided that agents know the true model
of the economy. However, as for instance argued in Branch and Evans (2006), the
concept of bounded rationality is more appropriate here. According to the concept,
agents do not know the true model of the economy in reality but they will rather
apply a simple model that is easily applicable and serves the respective purpose.
For instance, resource constraints or limited tools for information processing will
advocate the use of a simple model on behalf of private agents.
Moreover, agents may be quite heterogeneous with respect to resource con-
straints or as far as the evaluation of a bad forecast is concerned. Therefore, the
theory of heterogeneous expectations outlined in – among others – Branch (2004)
suggests that each agent undertakes a different effort to find a suitable forecasting
model and to get an estimate of the model’s parameters. That is one reason why
one part of the agents may, for instance, be rational or trend learner, another part
will simply be backward–looking or completely ignorant.
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This is the framework for the present analysis, where, on the one hand, survey
participants are characterized by a lack of information with respect to target infla-
tion. On the other hand, they will rely on a simple forecasting model. In particular,
they do not make the effort to find the true model of the economy. Moreover, it
may be the case that more than one “type” of forecaster contributes to the survey
result.
3.3.2 The Forecasting Model
In the following, I will formalize expectation formation of private agents. In the
spirit of bounded rationality, I assume that agents form expectations according
to a simple forecasting model in order to deal with limited information processing
capacities. The basic model consists of three (unobserved) components. It comprises
a time–varying trend πt that captures the permanent component of inflation and,
in addition, inflation inherits cyclical movements π̂t and unsystematic shocks εt.
The model is given by equations (3.2) to (3.4) which constitute the data generating
process for inflation expectations.
πt = πt + π̂t + dt + xt + εt εt ∼ N(0, σ2ε )(3.2)
πt+1 = πt + ηt ηt ∼ N(0, σ2η)(3.3) (
π̂t+1
π̂∗t+1
)
= ρ
(
cos λ sin λ
− sin λ cos λ
)(
π̂t
π̂∗t
)
+
(
κt+1
κ∗t+1
)
(3.4)
(
κt+1
κ∗t+1
)
∼ N(0,
(
σ2κ 0
0 σ2∗κ
)
)
This is basically the widely used trend plus cycle model introduced by Harvey
(1989) augmented by a vector of dummy variables dt and possibly some exogenous
variables xt, that may be useful when forecasting inflation. Above all, the model
accounts for the fact that there is a signal extraction problem as the distinct com-
ponents are not observable but have to be estimated. When learning about the
unobserved target, forecasters are assumed to update their perception each time
a new observation becomes available. To be more precise, they learn from their
forecast errors of the past. Like in Erceg and Levin (2003) agents make use of a
so–called constant gain learning rule. This means that, after having observed a fore-
cast error, each component is updated by a constant part of the error. Technically
speaking, when estimating the unobserved components, agents learn from noisy in-
formation contained in the forecast errors νt = πt − Et−hπt. In particular, there is
learning of both, trends as well as cycles at the same time. This is in contrast to the
standard adaptive learning scheme like in Pajfar and Santoro (2007), for example.
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Consequently, forecasters will behave very much like econometricians who estimate
an unobserved components model. In order to solve the signal extraction problem
optimally, they can make use of the Kalman filter recursions to obtain an estimate
of the unobserved components. The optimal gain is then given by the so–called
Kalman gain4.
3.3.3 Fitting Survey Expectations
The Framework
The present section tests whether expectation formation implied by equations (3.2)
to (3.4) can explain survey measures of expectation. In the following, an in–sample
perspective is taken. However, if the data generating process can be described by
the above equations, the process for inflation expectations can be written down in
the form of a state–space model which consists of an observation equation (3.5)
and state equations (3.6) to (3.8), which describe how unobserved components are
estimated.
(3.5) πt+1|t = πt+1|t + π̂t+1|t + βt+1dt+1
The subscript t|t − 1 denotes the mean of the distribution at t predicted from in-
formation up to time t − 1. The Kalman filter recursions, which are employed to
estimate the unobserved components are reformulated such that they only contain
predicted state variables. Expectations of trend and cycle in the next period (based
on the last prediction) are given by:
πt+1|t = πt|t−1 +K1,tνt(3.6)
π̂t+1|t = ρ cos λπ̂t|t−1 + ρ sin λπ̂
∗
t|t−1 + K̃2,tνt(3.7)
π̂∗t+1|t = −ρ sin λπ̂t|t−1 + ρ cos λπ̂∗t|t−1 + K̃3,tνt(3.8)
Here, νt = πt−πt|t−1 denotes the expectation error of the last period. It can be
shown that K̃2,t = ρ cos λK2,t +ρ sin λK3,t and K̃3,t = −ρ sin λK2,t +ρ cos λK3,t where
Ki,t represents the gain parameter according to which unobserved components are
4See Harvey (1989), chapter 3.2 or Hamilton (1994), chapter 13.2 for a derivation of the Kalman
updating algorithm which yields the conditional mean of the distribution of unobserved compo-
nents. The procedure minimizes the squared forecast errors provided the system is linear and
disturbances are Gaussian white noise processes.
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updated when a misperception of inflation occurs5. In particular, K1,t determines
the update of the estimated trend and K2,t determines the updating scheme with
respect to the transitory part. K3,t captures an indirect effect of misperceptions on
the update of the transitory component and is given for completeness. The optimal
forecasting scheme with respect to the data generating process given in section 3.3.2
is given by the Kalman filtering rule. Thus, trend expectations should be updated
by an amount equal to the implied Kalman gain.
In order to investigate the properties of the survey, the conditional mean in
the future πt+h|t is replaced by survey expectations πet+h|t. The forecast error νt is
exchanged with its observed counterpart, associated with the respective survey with
forecast horizon h, i.e. νet = πt−πet|t−h6. For estimation purpose, εt reflects the part
of survey expectations which is not explained by the model.
In this simple univariate setting, equations (3.7) and (3.8) capture the persis-
tence of the transitory part of expectations. In addition, the model allows for signal
extraction – i.e. learning from repeated forecast errors, because trend learning is
necessarily associated to the estimation of the cyclical component. Hence, a part of
the forecast error is related to misperceptions of the cyclical part. Thus, we obtain
in–sample estimates for the gain parameters K1,t to K3,t for each survey. These
determine the speed of learning of survey participants when a change of unobserved
trend inflation occurs. Furthermore, we can test if extracted trend expectations are
characterized by persistence and it is possible to infer the speed of trend learning.
Estimation Results
The system which consists of equations (3.5) to (3.8) is estimated by maximum
likelihood. The diffuse likelihood is computed by the Kalman filter with diffuse prior
density of the initial state vector. The parameter vector ψ =
(
σ2ε λ ρ
)
consists
of the variance of the irregular component εt, the cycle length λ and the so–called
dampening factor ρ. It is reparameterized such that the theoretical restrictions are
fulfilled (see appendix 3.A for details). Dummy variables are set when the outlier test
proposed by Harvey and Koopman (1992) indicated an outlier. Common regression
diagnostics and a histogram of past forecast errors νt are given in appendix 3.C.
The gain parameters Ki,T can be extracted from the smoothed state vector and
are not restricted during estimation, whereas the smoothing recursions also yield
estimated standard errors. The estimated parameters are summarized in table 3.2
5Note that gain parameters Ki,t relate to reduced form parameters K̃i,t in a linear way.
6In the cases where h > 1, this implies that forecasters apply some kind of direct multi–step
forecasting. Hence, the gain parameters cannot be interpreted as the usual Kalman gains any more.
In other words, signal extraction with the Kalman filter would only yield a minimum forecast error,
if it relies on the one–step–ahead forecasting error from SPF h=1 and LIV h=1.
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for each survey. The in–sample observation period generally runs from 1972 to 2007
for SPF and LIV. For MHS the sample only begins in 1979, as the survey has
not been published before. Hence, there is at least one possible structural break
agents may have learned which is commonly associated with the beginning of the
Volcker era. Taking a look at equations (3.5) to (3.8), it becomes clear that there
is only one error term in the system (εt) which captures irregularities. Hence, in a
technical sense, the estimated unobserved components are non–stochastic as far as
the Kalman recursions are concerned – i.e. the dynamics of all dependent variables
is solely explained by past forecast errors and autoregressive elements.
σ̂2ε λ̂ ρ̂ K1 K2 K3
SPF h=1 72–07 0.469
(0.690)
0.261
(0.244)
0.953
(0.139)
0.119
(0.004)
0.010
(0.018)
0.066
(0.013)
SPF h=4 72–07 0.218
(0.318)
0.006
(0.611)
0.002
(0.014)
0.077
(0.002)
317.5
(–)
1.041
(–)
LIV h=1 72–07 2.020
(3.253)
2.307
(–)
0.000
(0.000)
0.136
(0.009)
0.016
(–)
0.063
(–)
LIV h=2 72–07 0.660
(0.968)
0.000
(0.622)
0.001
(0.010)
0.160
(0.007)
315.0
(–)
0.008
(–)
MHS h=12 79–07 0.171
(0.246)
0.001
(0.013)
0.925
(0.080)
−0.004
(0.002)
0.057
(0.004)
−0.602
(0.234)
Note: The table shows maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters and estimated constant gain
coefficients of the surveys. Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. A (–) indicates that numerical
estimates are not available, which is the case if ρ is close to the lower bound of zero. Estimated parameters
are presented for completeness.
Table 3.2: Estimated parameters
Turning to table 3.2, one observes that estimated variances σ2ε , which are
presented in the first column, are in a plausible range. However, estimates are not
very precise. The estimated cycle parameters, which are given in column two and
three, show a more heterogeneous picture. In the case of SPF h=1 the estimate is
0.26 which implies a cycle length of approximately 24 quarters. ρ̂ which determines
the “sluggishness” of the cycle is in a plausible range being compatible with the
concept of an autoregressive transitory component. Turning to the longer forecasting
horizon (SPF h=4), cycle length is considerably longer. Interestingly, ρ̂ is zero,
which implies that there is no autoregressive part in the system and the cyclical
dynamics can solely be explained by past forecast errors made four periods ago.
As far as LIV is concerned, the survey which has a shorter horizon (h=1), yields
a dampening factor of zero. Moreover, much of the variation of expectations in
LIV h=1 is captured by the error term, which has a rather high variance. Cycle
parameters for LIV h=2 also indicate that autoregressive elements cannot explain
the cyclical behavior of expectations. In other words, past forecast errors seem to
be responsible for most of the persistence in the cyclical component. Most notably,
the model seems to be supportive for the trend learning hypothesis. The gain
parameters of SPF and LIV, although not restricted during estimation, lie between
0.08 and 0.16, depending on the survey. This means that in the case of SPF h=1, for
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instance, about 12 percent of the last error is attributable to trend mis–perceptions.
Moreover, in both surveys, K1 is highly significant which leads to the conclusion
that trend updating is an important characteristic of inflation expectations.
Interestingly, estimation results differ quite a bit for MHS. Here, we observe
a λ which is practically zero, meaning there is no cyclicality. However, the damp-
ening factor is close to one and, hence, persistence of the cyclical component is
captured to a large extent by autocorrelation; but also learning gains seem to be
important. However, estimates of K1 are significantly negative, which would imply
that the adjustment is made into the wrong direction. But also note, that trend ad-
justment is economically unimportant when compared to the adjustment of “cycle”
expectations.
Trend and Cyclical Components of Expectations
Figures 3.4 to 3.8 depict the unobserved components which are extracted by the
Kalman smoothing recursions beginning in 1972 and 1979, respectively.
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Figure 3.4: Learning model SPF h=1
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Note: The upper left panel shows inflation expectations together with the smoothed expected trend πe
t|T where T
is the last available observation. The second panel depicts the smoothed cyclical component π̂e
t|T . The irregular
component εt and the forecast error νt are given in the lower part.
Figure 3.5: Learning model SPF h=4
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Figure 3.6: Learning model LIV h=1
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Note: The upper left panel shows inflation expectations together with the smoothed expected trend πe
t|T where T
is the last available observation. It also contains long–term (10 years) inflation expectations from LIV. The second
panel depicts the smoothed cyclical component π̂e
t|T . The irregular component εt and the forecast error νt are given
in the lower part.
Figure 3.7: Learning model LIV h=2
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Note: The upper left panel shows inflation expectations together with the smoothed expected trend πe
t|T where T
is the last available observation. It also contains long–term (5 years) inflation expectations from MHS. The second
panel depicts the smoothed cyclical component π̂e
t|T . The irregular component εt and the forecast error νt are given
in the lower part.
Figure 3.8: Learning model MHS h=12
The upper left hand graph depicts the original expectation series πet together
with the estimated trend component and an error band of two standard deviations.
In general, it becomes apparent that trend expectations do not jump. By contrast,
they are very sluggish and move rather slow. Note that, although stemming from
different surveys and comprising quite different target variables, the general picture
presented in the figures is quite similar. As a consequence, it takes until the mid–
nineties to obtain trend expectations that are around 3%. Turning to SPF, this is
reflected by the fact that estimated gain parameters K1 in table 3.2 are rather low.
This implies that each quarter – by and large – only ten percent of the forecast error
is attributable to trend misperceptions. This would be a possible explanation why,
in the event of a changing target inflation, expectations show persistence.
Inspection of the transient component reveals that cyclical movements are
much more pronounced until the mid–eighties. The same seems to be true for
forecast errors. As outlined before, cyclical movements of SPF h=4 are related to
past forecast errors only. As the model is written, the irregular component of the
signal equation captures all of the unexplained part of the dynamics. Admittedly,
here it still displays some systematic movements. In the first place, this is a hint
that assuming learning behavior is not sufficient because it cannot explain all of
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the expectation formation process perfectly. An observation strongly emphasized
by the literature on heterogeneous expectations7. Secondly, however, there may also
be a time–varying nature to the expectations formation process. Just imagine that
during tranquil periods, like after 1987, it may be worthwhile for the agents to adapt
a simple backward–looking forecasting scheme. This could, in principal be tested
by splitting the sample. However, for an estimation of the structural time–series
model the period is rather short. Note, however, that there seems to be a change in
the behavior of εt, which seems to display less systematical movements during the
Volcker period. That is one reason why, for the later analysis, the sample will be split
in 1987. Another observation can be made when comparing trend estimates for SPF
h=1 and SPF h=4. The peak of trend expectations is earlier for the survey with the
shorter forecasting horizon. This is explained by the fact that information on the
forecast error is available earlier, which would also explain some of the differences
of the cyclical component of both series.
Now turning to LIV h=1, we observe a flat cyclical pattern, whereas the resid-
ual component captures most of the dynamics. Hence, past forecast errors seem to
explain trend dynamics but do not account for the transitory movements. However,
the model seems not to be completely at odds, as it is capable to reproduce a trend
that is consistent with long–term inflation expectations contained in the Livingston
Survey. Moreover, the trend is learned quite slowly as estimated gain parameters
imply that every half year by and large 15% of the error is used to adjust trend
expectations. Compared to figure 3.6, a slightly different picture emerges for the
longer forecast horizon of one year. Here, as with SPF h=4, we observe cyclical
movements which are explained by past forecast errors. The peak is again later for
a one–year forecasting horizon than for six–month expectations, which is one reason
for the differences of the transient components of LIV h=1 and LIV h=2. However,
the trend is also consistent with the long–term expectations.
Considering MHS h=12, where the sample starts in 1979, we observe a differ-
ent picture than before. Trend expectations estimated with the proposed learning
model are flat, which indicates that there is no update of the trend due to past
forecast errors. A finding that comes along with estimates of K1 being virtually
zero. Moreover, trend expectations are inconsistent with long–term inflation expec-
tations from MHS. Interestingly, the observed long–term expectations seem to lie
above MHS h=12 for most of the time. This is in particular true for the disinflation
episode. Also note that the series features virtually no cyclicality after 1987. Ad-
ditionally, observed forecast errors for that period of time are less systematic than
in the other surveys8. Hence, learning may be an explanation for the dynamics of
the “cyclical” component, but not for the trend. This may have different reasons.
7See, for instance, Branch (2004) and the papers cited there.
8Also compare the cumulated forecast errors presented in figure 3.1.
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First, the estimations are based on a shorter sample which begins in 1979. Second,
MHS polls households which are probably faced with different incentives and re-
strictions than professionals when making a forecast. Moreover, in contrast to the
other surveys, the model may not give a suitable description because an update of
expectations is possible more quickly than assumed by the model. As MHS is con-
ducted on a monthly frequency, survey participants probably will not wait twelve
periods to update their information set, which would be the case here.
Generally speaking, it is possible to fit survey data on inflation expectations to
the simple learning model presented here. It produces the sluggishness of expecta-
tions in the event of shifts in target inflation. The reason is that agents are learning
from a noisy signal which – in the univariate setup here – is the past forecast error.
Note, that Ki has not been restricted during estimation. Nevertheless, K1 has the
correct sign and is significant, meaning that an underprediction leads to an upward
revision of the trend. In case of the cyclical component of expectations, results are
less clear–cut. Unfortunately, even a negative value for K3 occurs once. There are
differences when we regard different surveys, as the model does not seem to be a
good explanation of expectations contained in MHS h=12. There are also differ-
ences with respect to forecast horizons concerning the implied trend expectation.
As far as the cyclical component is concerned, LIV h=1 is the only case where the
transient part is not explained by the model. Admittedly, the simple model is not
capable to explain expectation formation perfectly, which translates into an irreg-
ular component that shows systematic movements. This is – in part – due to the
fact that I employ the same model for every survey measure. In section 3.5, I will
follow an approach where aggregate expectations are assumed to be heterogeneous,
which is one interpretation of the result presented in the analysis above. Another
implication of the present findings is, that there may be some time–variation of
expectation formation schemes depending on the distinct presidential periods. One
might conjecture that for the Volcker disinflation signal extraction seems to work
better than for the later period. Up to now, it is still an open question how quickly
agents would learn with a strict application of the Kalman filter. Consequently,
the following section presents an out–of–sample simulation that allows to compare
some common forecasting models with respect to forecast performance and – most
important – their ability to explain survey expectations.
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3.4 Forecasting Inflation
3.4.1 The Framework
In the following, I will simulate the forecasting exercise undertaken by survey partic-
ipants taking an out–of–sample perspective. Equations (3.2) to (3.4) constitute the
data generating process for inflation expectations, where the forecaster is assumed to
behave like an econometrician. Similar to Branch and Evans (2006), the forecasting
procedure can then be split up into three steps. In a first period, the forecaster gains
some experience over the dynamics of inflation rates. In this in–sample period, he
estimates the parameters of the model and runs the Kalman recursions to obtain es-
timates of the unobserved components. He also observes the updating gain implied
by the Kalman filter. This in–sample estimation period starts at the beginning of
1953 and ends in 1980 for all models. Thus, the first period covers 27 years of data
which should suffice to shape the experience of a forecaster – i.e. to obtain reliable
estimates. In a second step, the forecaster takes the estimated parameters as given
and extracts the unobserved components up to the last published record of inflation
by relying on the gain parameters estimated during the first period. This is done
subsequently for each observation following this in–sample period. In the third step,
the forecaster then generates an out–of–sample forecast of the signal variable – i.e.
inflation. The forecast horizon is chosen such that it matches the respective survey
forecast.9 Note that a number of different models have to be built, as survey ex-
pectations involve different target variables. In addition, some exogenous variables
have been added to the forecasting models to account for the fact that survey par-
ticipants might also look at aggregate output or interest rates when forming their
forecasts. As benchmark cases, I also introduce a naive forecasting scheme (Model
I) and a simple AR(1) model in first differences (Model II). The reason is, that the
model does not involve trend considerations explicitly. Nevertheless, some learn-
ing takes place because parameters are estimated by recursive least squares. To be
more precise, Model II comes very close to the type of learning models employed
by – among others – Branch and Evans (2006). It has the features of a widely im-
plemented (decreasing gain) learning algorithm as parameter estimates are updated
every time a new observation becomes available10. I also introduce perfect foresight,
which provides rational expectations (Model VII). In detail, the following models
9The forecast horizon is the next quarter (SPF h=1), the average of the next 4 quarters (SPF
h=4), the next half year (LIV h=1), the next year (LIV h=2) and the average of the next 12
months (MHS h=12).
10See Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for further details on recursive least squares learning
schemes. Here, it is generally assumed that private agents learn the parameter values of the
rational expectations solution of the model. Also see Branch and Evans (2006) and Weber (2007)
and the papers cited there for empirical approaches.
92 CHAPTER3: LEARNING TREND INFLATION
have been employed:
Model I: Etπt+h = πt
Model II: ∆πt = α0 + α1∆πt−1 + εt estimated recursively
Model III: πt = πt + π̂t + dt + εt
Model IV: πt = πt + π̂t + dt +
∑3
τ=0 ∆it−h−τ +
∑3
τ=0 ∆yt−h−τ + εt
Model V: Model III estimated recursively
Model VI: Model IV estimated recursively
Model VII: Etπt+h = πt+h
Here, ∆it denotes the change of the three month treasury bill rate measured
either on a quarterly frequency (SPF) or on a monthly frequency (LIV, MHS). ∆yt
is a measure of aggregate output growth, which means that the change of industrial
production has been employed on a monthly frequency and GDP growth for SPF,
which is observed on a quarterly frequency.11
Models III and VI are estimated by maximum likelihood, whereas the like-
lihood is computed by the Kalman filter, which is initialized with a diffuse prior
density of the state vector. The parameter vector, here, comprises five variables
ψ =
(
σ2η σ
2
κ λ ρ σ
2
ε
)
. During estimation ψ is reparameterized according to the-
oretical restrictions (see appendix 3.B for details). Models V and VI are essentially
the same as Models II and III but estimated recursively. This means that forecasters
come up with a new set of maximum likelihood estimates whenever new data be-
comes available. Most importantly, also the estimated gain parameters will change
with every new observation. This is a more sophisticated forecasting scheme than
before, as it assumes that forecasters revise their estimates from time to time. But
it also represents a learning scheme where agents learn from past misperceptions.
The different forecasting models are now used to forecast five different target
series, which are chosen such that they match the respective survey (see figure 3.1
for a graphical representation of the time series to be forecast). Note, that simulated
forecasters use monthly data for six and twelve month CPI inflation but the forecast
is made on a semi–annual frequency. However, for the twelve month average CPI
inflation series, the forecast is produced every month. To ensure that the simulated
forecasters start out with a well specified model in 1980, some dummy variables
are introduced to the model whenever the outlier t–test proposed by Harvey and
11Note that πt is the quarterly change of GDP inflation for SPF h=1, the average annualized
GDP inflation during the next four quarters for SPF h=4, the annualized 6 months CPI inflation for
LIV h=1, the twelve months CPI inflation for LIV h=2 and the average annualized CPI inflation
during the next twelve months for MHS h=12.
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Koopman (1992) showed signs of severe outliers. In appendix 3.D, the estimated
components and a couple of diagnostics is presented. On the whole, the tests give
satisfying results and indicate that the forecasting exercise relies on well specified
models, although, for each target variable, the same forecasting model has been
used. In case of the annualized 6 month CPI and the GDP deflator, tests show some
signs of a distinct structural break around 1975, not accounted for by the model.
3.4.2 Forecast Accuracy
In a next step, a test of forecast accuracy of Models I to VI is presented in table 3.312.
Here, negative values imply that the model in row i has a lower forecast error than
the model in column j. It becomes apparent that signal extraction with the simple
model performs poorly. In general, these models are dominated by simpler versions.
For instance, considering the models for GDP inflation, the recursive autoregressive
model (Model II) performs better than the other ones. Nevertheless, the models
are very similar as the test statistic is significant only in two cases. Interestingly,
estimating Models II and III recursively or adding interest rates and real output
to the equations does not seem to improve forecasting ability substantially. By
contrast, adding exogenous variables significantly reduces out–of–sample forecasting
ability in the quarterly GDP inflation model. The picture is similar for forecasts of
CPI inflation, where even the naive forecasting scheme produces the lowest forecast
errors for each of the three different target variables.
On the whole, it becomes clear that signal extraction with a simple univariate
model does not outperform other simple models as far as the forecasting error is con-
cerned. This is not surprising, as in all models – in the spirit of bounded rationality
– the dynamics is kept quite simple.
3.4.3 Estimated Parameters
Models V and VI are estimated recursively, whereas the resulting estimates of struc-
tural and gain parameters K1 to K3 are given in appendix 3.E in figures 3.20 to
3.2313. The upper part of the figure shows parameter estimates for Model V and
12The test has originally been proposed by Diebold and Mariano (1995) and has been augmented
by Harvey, Leybourne, and Newbold (1997) to account for overlapping forecast errors and small
sample bias. The null hypothesis is given by H0 : E[|πt+h − πf,it+h|t| − |πt+h − πf,jt+h|t|] = 0. Here,
πf,it+h|t is the h–period out–of–sample forecast stemming from model i.
13For the presentation of gain parameters, it is generally assumed that, once having estimated
the hyperparameters, the covariance matrix of innovations converges to the steady–state solution
when the Kalman filter is run up to the last observation. Hence, the graphs show the estimated
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Quarterly GDP inflation annualized (h=1) 4 quarter GDP inflation average (h=4)
Model I II III IV V VI I II III IV V VI
I 0.00 0.79 0.55 -1.18 0.50 -1.34 0.00 0.04 -0.55 -0.78 -0.46 -0.51
II -0.79 0.00 -0.07 -1.91 -0.22 -2.23 -0.04 0.00 -0.65 -1.05 -0.57 -0.72
III -0.55 0.07 0.00 -2.25 -0.41 -2.47 0.55 0.65 0.00 -0.64 1.04 0.14
IV 1.18 1.91 2.25 0.00 2.16 -0.14 0.78 1.05 0.64 0.00 0.82 1.14
V -0.50 0.22 0.41 -2.16 0.00 -2.46 0.46 0.57 -1.04 -0.82 0.00 -0.08
VI 1.34 2.23 2.47 0.14 2.46 0.00 0.51 0.72 -0.14 -1.14 0.08 0.00
6 month CPI inflation annualized (h=1) 12 month CPI inflation (h=2)
Model I II III IV V VI I II III IV V VI
I 0.00 -2.02 -2.59 -2.06 -2.49 -2.09 0.00 -2.47 -0.86 -0.60 -0.93 -0.66
II 2.02 0.00 -1.74 -1.26 -1.65 -1.27 2.47 0.00 -0.61 -0.37 -0.69 -0.43
III 2.59 1.74 0.00 0.37 0.48 0.48 0.86 0.61 0.00 1.31 -0.45 0.93
IV 2.06 1.26 -0.37 0.00 -0.18 0.23 0.60 0.37 -1.31 0.00 -1.25 -0.88
V 2.49 1.65 -0.48 0.18 0.00 0.29 0.93 0.69 0.45 1.25 0.00 1.14
VI 2.09 1.27 -0.48 -0.23 -0.29 0.00 0.66 0.43 -0.93 0.88 -1.14 0.00
12 month CPI inflation average (h=12)
Model I II III IV V VI
I 0.00 -1.87 -0.94 -0.93 -0.98 -0.25
II 1.87 0.00 -0.75 -0.73 -0.79 0.02
III 0.94 0.75 0.00 0.59 -0.05 1.12
IV 0.93 0.73 -0.59 0.00 -0.39 1.15
V 0.98 0.79 0.05 0.39 0.00 1.17
VI 0.25 -0.02 -1.12 -1.15 -1.17 0.00
Note: Numbers are modified Diebold–Mariano (DM) test statistics which follow a t–distribution with n− 1
degrees of freedom. Here, n = 108 (n = 54 and n = 324) is the number of out–of–sample forecasts in the top
(middle and lower) part of the table. Thus, H0 : DM = 0 (equal forecast performance) can be rejected on
the 5% level if the test statistic exceeds 1.98 (2.00 and 1.97) in absolute values (two–sided test). A negative
number means that the model in row i has a lower measured forecast error than the model in column j of
the respective panel.
Table 3.3: Modified Diebold–Mariano test on forecast properties
the lower part contains Model VI parameters. The respective left hand side panel
depicts estimated variances and cycle parameters and the implied gain parameters
can be observed from the right hand side graphs. On the whole, hyperparameters
are stable; only estimated variances seem to display some tendency to fall over time.
In the one or the other case, the simulation exercise converges to a solution that
implies a jump in parameter estimates, which would then show up as a distinct
peak or drop in the series. During this out–of–sample simulation, these occurrences
are simply taken as given and can be interpreted as the difficulty of the respective
forecaster in finding an appropriate model at each point in time. Turning now to
the case of GDP inflation, gain parameters start out lower in the beginning of the
estimation period with values around 0.40 and slowly rise to 0.50 when new data
becomes available. However, there is some variation of K1 over time – in particular
until around 1987. A very similar pattern emerges for the six month CPI inflation
model. The twelve month CPI inflation model updates trend forecasts with a gain
parameter which implies that about 70% of the error is associated with trend mis-
perceptions. Unfortunately, if interest rates and output are added to the equations,
gain parameters conditional on the whole data set available at the time the forecast is made.
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then the cycle turns out to be deterministic except during the first three years and
in the beginning of the nineties.
When comparing the gain parameters which apply for the out–of–sample mod-
els and estimated learning dynamics in–sample, it becomes apparent that in an out–
of–sample experiment forecasters would change their trend perceptions much more
often. Consequently, this leads to trend expectations that are more volatile than
those observed for the survey measures in section 3.3.3. Also note that these gain
parameters are optimal within this type of model in the sense that they minimize
the one–step ahead forecast error. However, one has to be careful when comparing
in–sample estimates of gain parameters with the out–of–sample counterparts calcu-
lated by strict application of the Kalman filter. The reason is that – as outlined in
section 3.3.3 – participants of SPF h=4, LIV h=2 and MHS h=12 are assumed to
learn from multi–step forecast errors that induce an overlap which is not the case for
the standard Kalman filter. Moreover, semi–annual CPI forecasts with a 6 month
horizon are based on a monthly model, which allows for a trend update every month.
This is not the case for the corresponding survey (LIV h=1) in the in–sample analy-
sis, where a trend update is based on semi–annual observations. Consequently, only
results for SPF h=1 should be compared directly to the out–of–sample results of the
present section. Here, it is apparent that agents could improve their forecast perfor-
mance by putting more weight on trend shifts – i.e. increasing the gain parameter
K1 from 0.12 to about 0.50.
3.4.4 Approximation of Survey Expectations
Having seen that forecasting properties of the proposed models is not generally better
than that of simple backward–looking ones, it is now important to see whether the
simulated forecast series πft+h|t match the survey–based measures π
e
t+h|t. In principal,
also the approximation properties can be tested by the augmented version of the
Diebold–Mariano statistic14. The resulting test statistics can be inferred from tables
3.4 to 3.6. In addition, the sample is split into two parts, the first one covering the
whole sample 1980–2007, the middle panel covers the Volcker disinflation period
1980–1987 and the last panel covers the more moderate period 1988–2007.
14Here, the null hypothesis is given by H0 : E[|πet+h − πf,it+h|t| − |πet+h − πf,jt+h|t|] = 0.
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Turning first to table 3.4, the left part gives results for the approximation of
SPF h=1. Considering the whole sample, Model IV clearly shows negative values
for the modified Diebold–Mariano test statistic throughout and, hence, dominates
the other out–of–sample forecasts. Moreover, the approximation error is even signif-
icantly lower when compared to forecasts obtained by Models I and II. This means
that, for SPF h=1, learning by signal–extraction clearly gives a better approximation
of survey expectations than a simple backward–looking forecasting scheme which is
given by Model I. Moreover, it also outperforms recursive least squares learning of
coefficients, which is represented by Model II. Interestingly, it also performs much
better than the recursively estimated models V and VI. Also note that all learning
models III to VI yield a closer approximation of SPF h=1 than the models which
are not characterized by signal extraction. As argued in section 3.2.2, rational ex-
pectation formation is a poor proxy for survey expectations. Splitting the sample
does not alter the results. Considering SPF h=4, which has a forecasting horizon of
one year, it becomes apparent that Model III – the simplest signal extraction model
– yields the best approximation. The difference here is even significant with the
exception of Model I. This basically remains true for the first sub–sample. However,
during the moderate period after 1987 the naive model proxies SPF h=4 closest but
if tested against Models III to VI the difference is not significant. Now turning to
the left part of table 3.5, it is apparent that Model V yields the approximation clos-
est to LIV h=1. Again, it outperforms Models I and II significantly when the test
is based on the whole sample and the first sub–sample. Survey expectations from
LIV h=1 cannot be approximated by rational expectations which perform worst of
all models. Looking at the right panel, results are mostly insignificant. For the
whole sample period recursive least squares learning seems to yield the smallest
deviation from LIV h=2 and, again, rational expectations perform worst. During
the period of disinflation, however, signal extraction gives the best description of
expectation formation as Model IV performs best in the first sub–sample. The sec-
ond sub–sample confirms the results found for the whole sample period. Coming
now to table 3.6, which contains results for MHS h=12, findings are rather mixed.
During the whole period, the recursively estimated Model VI gives the closest ap-
proximation of MHS h=12. Thus, one could conclude that, also in this case, signal
extraction provides the best explanation for survey expectations. However, results
are not significantly better than those obtained from rational expectations or naive
and simple autoregressive forecasting schemes. Moreover, when taking a look at the
first sample period, rational expectations seem to give the best approximation for
MHS h=12. When compared to figure 3.3 it becomes clear that, during the first
period, forecast errors do not show any sign of persistence which is in contrast to
the other survey measures of expectations and which may explain the last result.
When looking at the second sub–sample, it is apparent that the naive forecasting
scheme outperforms the other models.
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To sum up, signal extraction gives a pretty good approximation of the expec-
tation formation process. This is in particular the case for SPF h=1 and LIV h=1.
Here, learning by signal extraction generally outperforms other forecasting schemes.
Furthermore, it gives a significantly better approximation of expectation forma-
tion than recursive least squares learning. However, it remains unclear whether,
in general, expectations are better characterized by signal extraction models whose
estimated parameters are updated over time. For SPF h=1, recursively estimated
signal extraction models do not outperform learning models with fixed structural
parameters, whereas for LIV h=1 the recursively estimated model is better. Consid-
ering longer forecasting horizons of one year as in SPF h=4 and LIV h=2, learning
by signal extraction approximates survey expectations best at least during the Vol-
cker period. Consequently, I conclude that agents seem to change their forecasting
scheme over time, as during the second sample–period naive forecasting schemes
seem to be more important. But also note, that the performance of these models is
not significantly better when compared to Models III to VI. In case of MHS h=12,
results are not that clear–cut. Insofar, the findings from section 3.3.3 are confirmed.
Here again, it might play a role that this series is characterized by a large overlap of
twelve periods and, hence, additional information from month to month observations
should play an important role for the process of expectation formation.
3.5 Heterogeneous Expectations
Having argued that signal–extraction gives the best approximation of expectation
formation processes, it will now be important to show that these learning schemes
indeed give a close and valuable explanation of survey expectations. One of the
findings of sections 3.3.3 and 3.4.4 is the importance of the heterogeneity of inflation
expectations, as none of the models has so far been able to explain expectation
formation perfectly. Consequently, each of the forecasting models of section 3.4
may play a role in aggregate expectation measures. However, it can be estimated
how important the respective model is for an explanation of survey expectations.
Moreover, it will be possible, with the concept of heterogeneous expectations, to
test if a weighted average of different model forecasts made in section 3.4.4 matches
survey expectations arbitrarily closely. The weights are chosen such that the sum
of squared deviations υ2t of the linear model π
e
t+h|t =
∑V II
i=I βiπ
f,i
t+h|t +υt is minimized
with respect to βi under the restrictions
∑V II
i=I βi = 1 and 0 ≤ βi ≤ 1 ∀ i. The
resulting estimates are presented in table 3.7. Additionally, the explanatory power
of the respective linear model for survey expectations is provided by the R2 and
a Ljung–Box Q–test for autocorrelation is also given in the last two columns. All
results are presented for the same sub–samples as before.
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I II III IV V VI VII R2 Q(1) Q(4)
SPF h=1
80–07 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.65 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.86 0.00 0.00
80–87 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.88 0.86 0.12
88–07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.71 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.34 0.00 0.00
SPF h=4
80–07 0.40 0.00 0.59 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.87 0.00 0.00
80–87 0.18 0.00 0.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.86 0.03 0.21
88–07 0.81 0.00 0.11 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.43 0.00 0.00
LIV h=1
80–07 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.34 0.68 0.00 0.00
80–87 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.46 0.73 0.86
88–07 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.46 0.42 0.00 0.01
LIV h=2
80–07 0.00 0.46 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.79 0.00 0.00
80–87 0.00 0.47 0.38 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.65 0.70 0.21
88–07 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.56 0.00 0.00
MHS h=12
80–07 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.48 0.79 0.00 0.00
80–87 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.60 0.85 0.00 0.00
88–07 0.13 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.30 0.16 0.00 0.00
Note: Numbers represent weights of the respective forecast in the survey forecast. These weights are
chosen such that the sum of squared deviations υt of the linear model πet+h|t =
∑V II
i=I βiπ
f,i
t+h|t + υt
is minimized under the restrictions
∑V II
i=I βi = 1 and 0 ≤ βi ≤ 1∀i. The columns labeled Q(1) and
Q(4) contain p–values for a Ljung–Box Q–test for autocorrelation up to 1 and 4 periods, respectively.
The way it is conducted here, the test does not account for additional uncertainty contained in the
out–of–sample forecasts πf,i
t+h|t which enter the model.
Table 3.7: Estimated weights
A first look at the weights for Models III to VI reveals that more than half of the
participants seem to use a signal extraction type forecasting scheme. Interestingly,
the results are quite robust across different surveys, although, as stated before,
they comprise very different target variables and various forecasting horizons. The
differences, however, occur between the two sub–samples of each survey which is in
line with a time–varying behavior of respondents. The exception with respect to the
estimation results is, again, MHS where learning plays no prominent role. Leaving
MHS aside for the moment, it can be observed that the recursively estimated models
V and VI attain zero weight in all cases except LIV h=1. Considering the two sub–
samples separately, however, confirms the estimates of the other surveys. Results
presented by Branch and Evans (2006) also point in this direction. One important
result is given by the fact that signal extraction plays a prominent role in explaining
survey expectations especially during the Volcker period. For SPF, signal extraction
makes up for over 80% during the first sub–sample, whereas during the second period
it attains a weight of about 70% for SPF h=1 and only 18% for SPF h=4. In the
case of LIV this tendency is even more pronounced, as fractions change from more
than one half for the early period to virtually zero percent for the period after 1987.
Furthermore, rational expectations get a weight which is below 50% for all surveys
except MHS, which is in line with the results from above. Interestingly, the fraction
of rational respondents is always higher for the second sub–sample. At the same
time, however, also the share of naive forecasters increases for all surveys except
SPF h=1. Note, that in this case simple backward–looking behavior represented by
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Models I and II does not contribute to survey expectations. Now turning to MHS,
results suggest that there is no prominent role for learning behavior. Agents seem
to be either naive forecasters or rational. Only one third is found to use Model VI
for forecasting.
Looking at the last three columns of table 3.7, it becomes apparent that the
explanatory power of the estimated linear relationships is quite high. The R2 sug-
gests that more than 80% of the variation in case of SPF and about 70% of the
variation in case of LIV can be explained. Taking sub–samples into account yields
another interesting result. The explanatory power of the estimated relationships is
higher for the early disinflation period compared to the years after 1987. Moreover,
there are no signs of autocorrelation in the estimations covering the Volcker pe-
riod15. Although R2 is also fairly high for MHS during the first period, the residual
is still autocorrelated. Dynamics of the second period are also not well described by
heterogeneous expectations. This finding basically confirms the results presented in
tables 3.2 and 3.6.
On the whole, the concept of heterogeneous expectations with a prominent
role for signal extraction is well suited to explain survey measures of inflation ex-
pectations. During phases of disinflation, the model has more explanatory power
than in tranquil periods, as, during the Volcker period, the R2 is higher, the unex-
plained part is free of autocorrelation and the role of signal extraction is even more
prominent.
3.6 Conclusions
In a first step, I have shown that the behavior of surveys on inflation expectations
is not compatible with the concept of rational expectations. Survey expectations
are characterized by temporary bias and considerable persistence of forecast errors.
Many theoretical studies emphasize the importance of persistence of inflation ex-
pectations for the dynamics of the inflation rate. Moreover, theoretical models that
assume rational expectations unrealistically predict a jump of inflation expectations
following a change of the inflation target. Most importantly, such a behavior of
inflation expectations cannot explain why disinflation is costly in a purely forward–
looking framework. As far as the behavior of private agents is concerned, it is also
15The way it is conducted here, the test does not account for additional uncertainty contained
in the out–of–sample forecasts πf,it+h|t which enter the model as explanatory variables. Therefore,
standard parameter distributions and test statistics do not apply in this case. However, I use
standard autocorrelation tests to test for systematic behavior of υt. This can be justified by the
fact that the test is constructed with a null hypothesis of no autocorrelation and, thus, will reject
too often if additional estimation uncertainty is not taken account of.
APPENDIX 103
important to note that they are not assumed to be completely ignorant. By con-
trast, they are confronted with a difficult forecasting problem. The reason is that
the inflation target pursued by the central bank is not directly observable but has
to be estimated from a noisy signal.
One possible solution to this signal extraction problem is given by the Kalman
filtering framework which constitutes the learning rule of private agents. To be
more precise, I assume that agents estimate the trend plus cycle model proposed
by Harvey (1989) to infer trend shifts and transitory movements. It can be shown
that it is possible to fit such a model to inflation expectations of SPF and LIV.
The in–sample results suggest rather slow learning of trends which can explain the
sluggishness of U.S. inflation expectations.
In a next step, I conduct an out–of–sample forecasting exercise to simulate a
forecaster that solves the signal extraction problem by Kalman filtering. In detail,
I employ seven different models or type of forecasters which comprise the naive
forecaster, learning by recursive least squares, different types of learning by Kalman
filtering and a rational forecaster. It turns out that learning by Kalman filtering
approximates U.S. survey expectations closest – at least during the presidency of
Volcker. This holds true for several surveys comprising several target variables.
Finally, in the spirit of heterogeneous expectations, I construct a weighted average
of the employed forecasting schemes. It turns out that the concept of heterogeneous
expectations with a prominent role for signal extraction is well suited to explain
survey measures of inflation expectations. Moreover, there seems to be a change of
forecasting schemes over time as the model provides a better fit during the Volcker
period. The R2 is higher, the unexplained part is free of autocorrelation and the
role of signal extraction is even more prominent.
On the whole, learning in an uncertain environment provides a good expla-
nation for the sluggishness of inflation expectations. Moreover, a large fraction of
agents seems to solve some signal extraction problem during phases of disinflation.
However, it will be worthwile to look at other expectation measures such as market
based expectations observed in financial markets. Naturally, the use of individual
data should also provide additional insight. Moreover, it will be interesting to do
the in–sample analysis in a multivariate context where inflation expectations emerge
from some type of Phillips curve. Of course, also out–of–sample forecasts can be
generated by a multivariate model that uses information from other macroeconomic
variables.
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Appendix
3.A Reparameterization of Variables in Section 3.3.3
The parameters contained in ψ are reparameterized such that they obey the theoret-
ical restrictions. The parameter vector estimated by maximum likelihood is denoted
by θ. It is transformed by a vector of functions g(θ) in the following way:
(3.9) ψ =


λ
ρ
σ2ε

 ≡ g(θ) =


g1(θ)
g2(θ)
g3(θ)

 =


exp(θ1)
Φ(θ2)
exp(2θ3)

 .
In the second step we need to calculate the standard errors of the estimates.
It can be shown that the transformed estimates are asymptotically normal with
estimated variance v̂ar(ψ̂) = Gθ̂ v̂ar(θ̂) G
′
θ̂
.16 This yields the following adjustment
matrix of first derivatives Gθ̂
17.
Gθ̂ =


∂g1(θ̂)
∂θ1
· · · ∂g1(θ̂)
∂θ3
...
. . .
...
∂g3(θ̂)
∂θ1
· · · ∂g3(θ̂)
∂θ3


=


exp(θ̂1) 0 0
0 φ(θ̂2) 0
0 0 2 exp(2θ̂3)

 .
3.B Reparameterization of Variables in Section 3.4
The parameters contained in ψ are reparameterized such that they obey the theoret-
ical restrictions. The parameter vector estimated by maximum likelihood is denoted
16See for example Kim and Nelson (1999), chapter 2.
17The calculation of the standard error of the transformed estimates was done with the Delta
Method which relies on first–order Taylor expansions of non–linear functions. For an overview
compare Davidson and MacKinnon (2004) chapter 5.6.
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by θ. It is transformed by a vector of functions g(θ) in the following way:
(3.10) ψ =


σ2η,2
σ2κ
λ
ρ
σ2ε


≡ g(θ) =


g1(θ)
g2(θ)
g3(θ)
g4(θ)
g5(θ)


=


exp(2θ1)
exp(2θ2)(1− Φ(θ4)2)
exp(θ3)
Φ(θ4)
exp(2θ5)


.
3.C Diagnostics of the Learning Model
Figure 3.9 shows some diagnostics for the learning model. It depicts the respec-
tive standardized irregular component along with the associated histogram. The
respective third panel shows a histogram of forecast errors for comparison.
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Note: The upper graph provides an outlier t–test by plotting smoothed residuals. Below, a histogram of standardized
errors εt can be found. The last panel of the respective graph plots the distribution of observed forecast errors νt.
Figure 3.9: Diagnostics learning model
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3.D Diagnostics of the Forecasting Model
The following figures 3.10 to 3.18 contain smoothed unobserved components as esti-
mated by the forecasting models and diagnostics. The upper part of the graph shows
the estimated trend component along with the original series. The estimated cycli-
cal component can be found below. The last panel graphs the irregular component.
The lower panel depicts an outlier t–test, a break test which indicates distinct breaks
in the mean of the series not covered by the model. Furthermore, histograms of the
three standardized residuals in the system are presented, as well as the empirical
autocorrelation of the innovations obtained from the Kalman filtering recursions.
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Figure 3.10: Diagnostics Model III (1)
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Figure 3.11: Diagnostics Model IV (1)
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Figure 3.12: Diagnostics Model III (2)
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Figure 3.13: Diagnostics Model IV (2)
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Figure 3.14: Diagnostics Model III (3)
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Figure 3.15: Diagnostics Model IV (3)
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Figure 3.16: Diagnostics Model III (4)
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Figure 3.17: Diagnostics Model IV (4)
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Figure 3.18: Diagnostics Model III (5)
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Figure 3.19: Diagnostics Model IV (5)
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3.E Recursive Parameter Estimates
Figures 3.20 to 3.24 depict structural parameter estimates (left panel) along with
steady–state gain parameters taken from the state vector of the system described
by equations (3.2) to (3.4) (right panel). The upper part of the respective graph
shows estimates from Model V whereas estimates for Model VI are presented in the
lower panel.
80 85 90 95 00 05
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
σ2κ 
λ
ρ
σ2ε 
σ2η 
80 85 90 95 00 05
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
 K
1
 K
2
 K
3
80 85 90 95 00 05
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
σ2κ 
λ
ρ
σ2ε 
σ2η 
80 85 90 95 00 05
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
 K
1
 K
2
 K
3
Figure 3.20: Recursively estimated parameters, annualized quarterly GDP inflation
h=1
APPENDIX 119
80 85 90 95 00 05
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
σ2κ 
λ
ρ
σ2ε 
σ2η 
80 85 90 95 00 05
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
 K
1
 K
2
 K
3
80 85 90 95 00 05
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
σ2κ 
λ
ρ
σ2ε 
σ2η 
80 85 90 95 00 05
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
 K
1
 K
2
 K
3
Figure 3.21: Recursively estimated parameters, average annualized 4 quarter GDP
inflation h=4
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Figure 3.22: Recursively estimated parameters, annualized 6 month CPI inflation
h=1
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Figure 3.23: Recursively estimated parameters, 12 month CPI inflation h=2
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Figure 3.24: Recursively estimated parameters, 12 month average CPI inflation
h=12
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